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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Brief overview of co-operative tendu leaf 
marketing in MP
Tendu leaf collection was historically carried out by 
the Forest Department auctioning collection rights to 
contractors in return for royalty, with the contractors in 
turn engaging villagers as wage labourers. After the Bawa 
Committee report of 1971, the states began efforts to 
improve the lot of the collectors. In MP, after some failed 
attempts, the state government co-operativized the entire 
tendu leaf marketing process in 1988-89. It created 
a three-tier system of Primary Co-operative Societies (PCSs 
or Prathamik Samitis) at the scale of a few villages, District 
Unions (DUs) at district or forest division scale, and a state-
level Madhya Pradesh Minor Forest Produce (Trading 
& Development) Co-operative Federation (MFPFED). The 
MFPFED would set a minimum ‘collection wage’ for the 
tendu leaf pluckers and also eventually distribute some of the 
profits back to the pluckers in the form of ‘incentive wage’ 
or bonus, while paying royalty to the government. In 1998, 
responding to the PESA, the royalty was eliminated and a 
policy of distributing most of the net profit as incentive wage 
was established. Following the separation of Chhattisgarh 
state from MP in 2000, MP has 1,066 PCSs, organized into 
61 DUs, and officially involving 32 lakh tendu leaf pluckers.
The system works as follows. MFPFED calls for price bids 
(tenders) from contractors for each PCS approximately 
six months prior to the harvesting season. The highest 
bidder is awarded the contract and has to commit to 
buying a certain amount of leaf. Pruning of tendu bushes 
to encourage growth of tender leaves is carried out in 
February-March. During the harvest season, in May-
June, collectors pluck, sort and submit 50-leaf bundles 
to the phad (the collection centre). The contractor 
arranges for the leaves to be dried in the phad, packed 
and transferred to godowns. The PCS pays the collection 
wage to the pluckers using funds advanced by MFPFED. 
Payments from the contractor to MFPFED come in over 
Background
The collection and sale of non-timber forest products 
(NTFPs) forms a significant part of the livelihoods of forest-
fringe communities in India, with an estimated 10-27 
crore people involved in it. The leaf of tendu (Diospyros 
melanoxylon), which is used to roll beedis (Indian cigarettes), 
is one of the most socially and economically important 
NTFPs. Its collection provides employment to at least 
75 lakh leaf pluckers, largely in central India. Madhya Pradesh 
produces the largest volume of tendu leaf in the country, 
accounting for more than 25% of the national production.
All central Indian states have ‘nationalized’ tendu leaves in 
order to control its trade, and ostensibly follow policies to 
enhance incomes for tendu leaf pluckers. After the passing 
of the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 
(PESA) in 1996 and the Forest Rights Act (FRA) 2006, the 
states are under pressure to transfer rights over tendu leaf 
and all other NTFPs to forest-dwellers. But no practical 
approach has been worked out for this transition.
The MP (and Chhattisgarh) model, in which a three-tiered 
federation of co-operatives procures and markets tendu 
leaf, has been lauded by various committees as being 
the best approach to enhancing forest-dweller incomes 
and assuring their rights, and coming ‘closest to the soul 
and spirit of the PESA’. The MP government claims that 
it has ‘transferred ownership of NTFPs to Gram Sabhas’ 
through this model. There are, however, no systematic 
assessments of this model after 1998.
This report presents the results of a study of tendu leaf 
procurement and marketing in Madhya Pradesh during 
2010-12. The objective of the study was to understand how 
well the MP model has worked along different dimensions, 
and the factors influencing these outcomes, so as to inform 
the debate on future policy regarding NTFP procurement 
and marketing in light of the PESA and FRA.
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Study area and methodology
The study covered eight District Unions (DUs) and 25 
Primary Co-operative Societies (Prathamik Samitis or PCSs) 
across six districts – Betul, Dindori, Umaria, Sagar, Sehore 
and Vidisha. The districts were chosen as representing 
regions with high tendu leaf availability and varying Adivasi 
fraction of population (40-65% in the first three districts 
and low in the last three). Focus group discussions with 
tendu leaf pluckers were complemented by interviews, and 
participant observation to understand the rigours of the 
tendu leaf collection process. Household data on socio-
economic status and NTFP dependence were collected 
from 125 households. Interviews were conducted with Phad 
Munshis, PCS Prabandhaks, Forest Department officials, 
MFP Federation officials, tendu leaf contractors, former 
beedi manufacturers, researchers and activists. Secondary 
data were collected from offices at all levels, and from states 
of Maharashtra, Odisha and Rajasthan for comparison.
Performance
1. Efficiency: The MFPFED system initially brought 
about a big increase in the returns to collectors, but its 
effectiveness has declined over time and its potential 
has not been fully realized. In particular:
a. The tender price obtained in MP is only about 60% of 
the price at which the contractor sells the leaves to 
the beedi manufacturer.
b. The tender price obtained in MP is lower than the 
price obtained in Maharashtra or Odisha for leaves of 
similar quality and processing level.
c. The collector share in the tender price has improved 
over time but not crossed ~65%. The low share for 
the collectors is primarily due to the policy of diverting 
32–40% of the tender price towards village and forest 
development funds and the MFPFED corpus.
d. The first payment (collection wage) usually occurs 
promptly, although with irregularities in certain areas. 
The second payment (incentive wage or bonus) 
is, however, delayed inordinately (more than 12 
months). There are also significant irregularities in its 
disbursement. 
e. Currently, the first payment (collection wage) is on 
average less than 50% of the total final return, when 
it can be and has been as high as 80% in the past.
f. Although MFPFED has launched several ‘welfare’ 
schemes for the pluckers, such as group insurance 
and educational scholarship for children of leaf 
pluckers, the schemes are poorly implemented.
g. In Sagar district in particular, there appears to be a 
black market in tendu leaves, i.e., leaves being sold 
a six-month period, and after the accounts are finalized, 
60% of the net profit (after subtracting administrative costs) 
is disbursed to the pluckers as incentive wage, while 40% 
is transferred to Village and Forest Development Funds.
The governance of this system is supposed to be as 
follows. All tendu leaf pluckers are entitled to become 
members of the PCS. They elect a Prabandh Samiti 
(Executive Committee) for five years. The Samiti appoints a 
Prabandhak (manager) and the Phad Munshis (who manage 
the collection centres). The members of all Samitis in one 
DU elect a 10-member board of the DU. The Divisional 
Forest Officer is the Managing Director of the DU. All DUs in 
turn elect 9 members to the Board of Directors of MFPFED. 
Another 9 directors are either state-nominated or ex-officio 
from different departments. The Chairperson of MFPFED 
is usually appointed by the Registrar of Co-operatives. The 
day-to-day operations of MFPFED are handled by officers 
on deputation from the Forest Department. This three-tier 
co-operative federation is hereinafter referred to as the 
‘MFPFED system’.
Objectives and conceptual framework
To assess how the MFPFED-led co-operative system of 
tendu leaf procurement works in Madhya Pradesh, we 
used the following criteria:
1. Efficiency, that is, 
 a. obtaining the best price in the tendu leaf market, 
 b. passing on as much of this price to the collectors as 
  possible in a timely manner,
 c. effectively delivering any additional services promised 
to the collectors.
2. Fairness, that is, 
 a. fair distribution of the benefits of cooperation between 
PCSs
 b. returns to individual collectors in proportion to the 
quantity and quality of produce they supply.
3. Financial and ecological sustainability, that is, 
 a. avoiding continuous losses and building up of working 
capital and reserves,
 b. ensuring sustainable harvest of the forest product.
4. Democratic governance, that is, whether the co-
operative system functions as a ‘voluntary association of 
individuals’, whether it is downwardly accountable and 
transparent.
 To explain the extent of success or failure, we explored 
frameworks from both institutional analysis and political 
economy literatures, the former focusing on the design of 
the co-operatives and the latter on why certain designs 
are chosen over others. 
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In particular:
a. Most leaf pluckers remain unaware of the existence 
of co-operative societies even after 25 years of their 
existence. They continue to think of themselves as 
wage labourers rather than owners of the produce, 
an impression reinforced by terms such as ‘collection 
wage’ and ‘bonus’. Payment of bonus in public 
functions by MLAs further reinforces the feeling of it 
being state largesse, rather than of it being rightful 
income.
b. Membership rolls have not been updated and 
elections have not been held for many years in most 
places. Often elected representatives do not even 
know whether they are still in office. Elections, if held, 
appear to be closed-door affairs managed by the 
Forest Department.
c. In any case, elected executive committees of PCS 
and DU have no financial powers, functioning as 
rubber-stamps of the Forest Department. The level of 
awareness of office-bearers regarding the functioning 
of the tendu leaf marketing system is generally 
abysmally low; they openly acknowledge that ‘control 
lies with the Forest Department’. 
d. Lack of control by the pluckers enables irregularities 
and leakages at various levels, starting from the Phad 
Munshi.
e. At the higher levels, the DUs are directly controlled 
by the local DFOs in their capacity as Managing 
Directors, and the Board of Directors of MFPFED 
is stacked with government officials, and chaired 
by ministers or MLAs, negating the very idea of a 
bottom-up federation of co-operatives of collectors. 
All the executive positions in MFPFED are held by 
forest officers.
In short, the so-called co-operative marketing structure 
is simply a façade for a fully state-controlled (largely 
Forest Department-controlled) system with no downward 
accountability. Moreover, while marketing co-operatives are 
based on the assumption that members own the produce, 
in the case of tendu leaf and NTFPs in general, even after 
the passage of PESA and FRA, the state is the de facto 
owner of the produce. Thus, the tendu leaf pluckers are still 
essentially wage labourers who are allowed to gather state-
owned produce from state-owned forests and are required 
to bring the produce to the state-run co-operatives.
Explaining the performance
Since these co-operatives were set up top-down and 
continue to function in that manner, the theory of collective 
action institutions cannot explain any shortcomings in 
performance. The functioning of the system is best explained 
directly by collectors to beedi makers, bypassing the 
PCS, leading to a loss of returns to the PCS (and 
eventually to the collectors).
2. Equity within and across PCSs: The system is generally 
equitable, although Sagar district presents anomalies. In 
particular:
a. Within PCSs, barring some irregularities in noting 
of the amount of tendu leaf collected and in bonus 
distribution, there is a fair distribution of returns 
amongst collectors.
b. Between PCSs, those with better quality leaves 
should get better returns, and this is indeed the case 
in most of MP. In Sagar district, however, no bonuses 
have been paid in many profit-making PCSs because 
some other PCSs in the district are making losses. 
An unfair and unwritten cross-subsidy policy appears 
to be in place. 
3. Financial and ecological sustainability: The system is 
financially sustainable and generally functions smoothly. 
Its ecological sustainability is unclear. In particular:
a. There have not been cases of large-scale 
misappropriation of funds in the system. Nor is it 
being subsidized by the state, or incurring debts from 
any other sources. MFPFED has accumulated a large 
corpus over the years and has tried to diversify its 
activities.
b. The system has been financially sustainable. By 
shifting to pre-harvest tendering, MFPFED has shifted 
much of the risk on to the contractors. 
c. However, the risk of not receiving any tender bid at 
all for a PCS still exists. This has been addressed by 
the rather questionable practice of cross-subsidizing 
from the profits of other PCSs.
d. A rigorous analysis of ecological sustainability was not 
possible within this study. However, the amount of 
tendu leaf harvest appears to have remained steady 
over the years, suggesting that the harvesting is 
somewhat ecologically sustainable.
e. But there is a raging and unresolved debate between 
the forest department, the pluckers and the contractors 
regarding the role of fire and pruning in maintaining 
short-term productivity, long-term sustainability and 
impacts on the larger forest ecosystem. 
4. Democratic governance and empowerment: 
 Co-operative societies are supposed to be voluntary 
collective action institutions, owned by and accountable 
to their members through transparent functioning, 
annual general meetings and elections. The tendu leaf 
co-operatives in MP are, however, a far cry from this 
ideal, and even more so from the claim of ‘transferring 
of NTFP rights to Gram Sabhas in response to PESA’. 
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e. Make the administrative cost calculations transparent; 
and
f. Invite tenders from a wider set of contractors from 
outside Madhya Pradesh to make the bidding more 
competitive.
Even the implementation of these simple measures, 
however, is unlikely unless forest-dependent communities 
mobilize and demand a say in the running of the so-called 
co-operatives. The PESA and the FRA provide a legal basis 
to demand this say and ensure downward accountability. Of 
course, with such rights will come greater responsibility as 
well, including the management of cash flow, dealing with 
contractors, and carrying out tendu leaf pruning operations 
on their own. Some communities, generally those that 
have been supported by activists, are ready to accept this 
challenge. They have demanded that the working capital 
corpus currently used by MFPFED should be transferred 
proportionately to the PCSs. Other communities, however, 
remain at much lower levels of awareness and mobilization. 
Short-term top-down measures will have to be 
accompanied by widespread grassroots-level mobilization 
if the system has to improve in the long run.
in terms of the interplay between three powerful actors, viz., 
the tendu leaf contractors (and beedi manufacturers), state 
politicians and the forest bureaucracy. The idea of setting 
up these co-operatives was the brain-child of a politician 
seeking to break the hold of the tendu leaf contractor lobby 
in state politics. Over time, the co-operatives have become 
platforms for launching political careers and for pleasing the 
larger electorate by appearing to distribute state largesse, 
while tendu leaf contractors and the Forest Department 
enter into a comfortable arrangement that ensures that the 
forests and forest produce harvesting are controlled by the 
department without putting undue pressure on the margins 
of the contractors. The tendu leaf pluckers are appeased 
by small increases with wage rates, releasing bonuses with 
political fanfare, and announcing some populist welfare 
measures with the pluckers’ own money.
A different lens: A costless state employment scheme?
One may take the perspective that it does not matter that 
the system is not a genuine co-operative federation, as 
long as the economic interests of the tendu leaf pluckers 
are protected. From this perspective, while the MFPFED 
system is a smoothly functioning employment scheme using 
state forest resources that does not impose any financial 
burden on the state, it provides a barely adequate return to 
the pluckers for the labour they put in. There is significant 
variation in the labour-time spent in collection and bundling 
of tendu leaves, and on the whole the effective return to 
labour-time is lower than the state’s minimum wage rate. 
The delays in the second payment, the unfair diversion 
of pluckers’ earnings towards so-called village and forest 
development and other forms of micro-level harassment 
aggravate the problem. Thus, even after setting aside the 
expectation of decentralized, democratic governance that 
is the imperative of PESA and FRA legislations, the system 
can only be said to be a limited success. 
Policy implications
Even within the narrow paradigm of employment generation, 
the state can take the following measures to benefit the 
pluckers in the short-run:
a. Abolish the deduction towards village and forest 
development funds;
b. Increase the first payment (collection wage) to 75% 
of the tender price;
c. Shorten the payment period for the contractors to five 
months after the leaf reaches the phad, and calculate 
and distribute the second payment within one month 
of the last payment from the contractor;
d. Redress grievances regarding the irregularities in 
disbursement of wages;
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NTFP collection continues to play a crucial role in the 
livelihoods of forest-adjacent villagers, especially many 
adivasi communities. 
Since the 1970s, central and state governments 
have ostensibly recognized and responded to this 
dependence by initiating a series of policies and 
programmes to enhance the benefits from NTFP 
collection, especially to Adivasi communities. The 
perennial question is whether, and to what extent, 
these policies and programmes have actually 
benefited NTFP collectors (Fernandes et al. 1988; 
Lélé and Rao 1996). With the passage of the PESA2 
in 1996 and, more recently, the Forest Rights Act3 
(hereinafter FRA) in 2006, the debate has become 
sharper and also expanded from the question of just 
magnitude of benefits to that of empowerment. State 
governments continue to justify their existing policies, 
which require significant state involvement in NTFP 
procurement and marketing, while activists demand 
full implementation of NTFP rights promised to forest-
dwellers. Tendu leaf, the leaf of Diospyros melanoxylon, 
is the most commercially valuable NTFP of central India 
(other than bamboo), with the most organized systems 
of procurement and marketing. It is therefore a suitable 
case for examining these questions.
The leaf of tendu (in Hindi, or kendu in Odiya or tumri in 
Marathi) is used in wrapping tobacco to make the beedi 
or Indian cigarette. It is one of the most economically 
valuable NTFPs in India, with recent consolidated annual 
sales of nearly `1,900 crores in Madhya Pradesh (MP), 
Non-timber forest products (NTFPs) have been the focus of research and policy attention over the 
last several decades from the perspectives of poverty 
alleviation, cultural rights as well as forest conservation. 
The collection and sale of NTFPs forms a significant part 
of the livelihood of forest-dependent peoples in many 
parts of the world (Kusters and Belcher 2004; Laird et 
al. 2010), not just in terms of its total contribution to 
income but also because this activity is often carried 
out during the lean season. It provides a safety net 
(Shackleton and Shackleton 2004), and can provide 
crucial cash income in an otherwise subsistence 
economy. For certain forest-dwelling communities, 
NTFPs are an essential part of their diet, health-care 
and cultural practices. Conservationists have also 
argued in favour of NTFP extraction because it can 
have lower impact on biodiversity than timber logging 
or firewood extraction (Panayotou and Ashton 1992). 
Enhancing NTFP-based incomes for forest-dwelling 
communities has therefore often been seen as a win–
win proposition from these multiple perspectives.
In the Indian context, forest-dwelling communities in 
central India (especially, but not exclusively, Scheduled 
Tribes or adivasis1) have been known to be particularly 
dependent on NTFPs not only for income generation 
but also self-consumption (e.g., Mitchell et al. 2003). 
Estimates of the number of NTFP collectors in India 
range from 100 million to 275 million (MoPr 2011). 
Even with increasing opportunities in other sectors, 
INTRODUCTION
1
1 We prefer to use the term adivasi, which in the Indian discourse is used synonymously with ‘tribal’ and ‘indigenous community’.
2The Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1994 is a law that provides for self-governance among adivasi communities in the Scheduled Areas.
3More precisely, the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006.
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[co-operative] society based federal system of Madhya 
Pradesh and Chhattisgarh states appeared to the 
Committee to be the best (sic) democratic and decentralized 
system that comes closest to the soul and spirit of the PESA. 
It has evolved over decades and has stood well the test of 
times.” (MoPr 2007, p.29-30, section 4.1.1).
Notwithstanding these claims, the question of who 
owns NTFPs in general and the valuable tendu leaf in 
particular has re-emerged with greater vigour at the 
national level after the passing of the FRA. This Act 
explicitly confers ownership, extraction and sale rights 
over all ‘minor’ forest products on forest dwellers. The 
Haque committee, set up by the MoPR in 2010 after the 
promulgation of the FRA, pointed out that there is no 
statutory reconciliation in MP between the PESA, the 
Panchayat Act and the state-level tendu leaf Act (MoPr 
2011, p.8), and therefore no control of Gram Panchayats 
(village-level councils) or Gram Sabhas (village-level 
general bodies) over the co-operatives (MoPr 2011, 
p.27). In 2013, some of the villages in Maharashtra 
that received Community Forest Rights under the FRA 
demanded that they be allowed to harvest and sell 
tendu leaves outside the state-appointed contractor 
system, and in April 2013, the Maharashtra government 
gave 18 villages this right (Pallavi 2013). Exercising this 
right, however, proved to be challenging (Dahat 2013), 
as the tendu leaf contractors boycotted the pre-harvest 
auction by the villagers, and the Maharashtra State 
Tribal Development Corporation was asked to step in 
and provide working capital and a purchase guarantee.
In this context, the MFPFED’s claim that its model 
constitutes transfer of ownership of non-wood forest 
produce to Gram Sabhas, and the Sharma Committee’s 
endorsement of this claim, acquires significance and 
deserves careful scrutiny. All studies of the MP system 
available in the literature were either carried out right 
after co-operativization (Lal and Dave 1991; Marothia 
1992) or just before the crucial decision to abolish 
royalties was taken in 1998 (Bhogal 2000). A rigorous 
and comprehensive analysis of the MFPFED system7 is 
therefore essential to formulating future policy in this 
sector, not only in MP but also in other states.8
Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Maharashtra.4 In terms of 
livelihoods, the plucking of the tendu leaf generates 
six weeks of employment annually for approximately 
7.5 million people, many of whom are adivasis, and come 
from marginalized sections of society (Lal 2012). The leaf 
is procured largely from the central Indian states of MP, 
Chhattisgarh, and Odisha, along with Maharashtra, Andhra 
Pradesh, Jharkhand and Rajasthan. MP is the largest 
producer of the tendu leaf and accounts for 25% of the 
total annual production of the leaf in the country, with 
annual sales exceeding `600 crores in 2012 (MFPFED 
2013). The fraction of rural households involved in tendu 
leaf plucking may be as high as 85–90% in adivasi-
dominated villages in these states.5
Each of these states passed legislation in the 1960s 
or early 1970s to ‘nationalize’ tendu leaves, enabling 
the state to exercise monopoly control on the harvest, 
transport and sale of this product (Lele et al. 2010). 
Although this nationalization paid lip service to the 
need for protecting the ‘poor, illiterate adivasi’ tendu 
leaf collectors from unscrupulous middle-men it was 
essentially a continuation of British colonial policy of 
imposing state monopolies over all valuable forest 
products to maximize state revenues through royalties. 
After the passing of the PESA legislation in 1996, some 
states stopped taking these royalties, although they have 
continued to maintain a tight control over the whole 
process. MP (including present-day Chhattisgarh) was 
the only state that, in addition to abolishing royalties 
in 1998, had already implemented a three-tier co-
operative structure for tendu leaf marketing, called 
the Madhya Pradesh Minor Forest Produce (Trading & 
Development) Co-operative Federation Limited (MFPFED 
for short), with the goal of maximizing returns to tendu 
leaf collectors. The MFPFED website claims that “Madhya 
Pradesh became the first state in the country to decide 
upon transfer of ownership of non-wood forest produce to 
the Gram Sabhas (local level Panchayati Raj institutions)”.6 
The Sharma Committee that was set up by the Ministry 
of Panchayati Raj in the wake of the PESA to study the 
question of NTFP ownership and functioning of state 
agencies in PESA states also extolled the MP model. The 
committee’s report stated that “the three-tier 
4 According to the websites of the Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh MFP Federations, the sales receipts from tendu leaf in these two states were `634 
crores and `620 crores, respectively, in 2012. In Maharashtra, data shared by the Forest Department show that the state government collected a royalty 
of `140 crores in 2012 and that a sum of `84 crores was paid out as collection wages in 2011. In Odisha, the Odisha Forest Development Corporation 
recorded sales of `413 crores for 2011.
5 See Mitchell et al. 2003. Further corroborated by field data from Madhya Pradesh.
6 http://www.mfpfederation.org/website/content/about_us.html.
7 While strictly speaking, MFPFED refers only to the state-level federation of co-operatives, in practice, all the three tiers are fully integrated and controlled 
by MFPFED. So, we use the term ‘MFPFED system’ to refer to the entire three-tier structure. 
8Given the negative health implications of beedi smoking (Gupta and Asma 2008), the pressure to reduce beedi consumption is increasing (e.g., Jha 
et al. 2011). It may therefore be argued that tendu leaf collection is a sunset industry with no future, and policy attention should not be devoted to its 
perpetuation. While acknowledging its public health implications, we believe that the livelihood importance of this product is unlikely to decrease any time 
soon, and given the sheer number of people involved in the harvest, and the marginalized status of most of them, tendu leaf policy needs attention in the 
short run, even if the long run goal may be to provide alternative livelihoods to the pluckers.
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We studied the tendu leaf procurement and marketing 
system in MP during 2010–12 and present the results in 
this paper. The objective of the study was to understand 
the strengths and weaknesses of the MFPFED model, 
and the factors shaping them, so as to inform the debate 
on future policy regarding tendu leaf procurement and 
marketing in light of the FRA and PESA. We begin by 
describing, briefly, the history and current structure 
and functioning of the co-operative tendu leaf marketing 
system in MP (section 2). We then outline the conceptual 
framework (section 3) and the methods (section 4) used in 
this study. The findings regarding outcomes are presented 
in section 5, followed by a discussion on what might 
explain the outcomes observed (section 6). In conclusion, 
we discuss the policy implications of these findings, 
especially in light of the changed legal status 
of the tendu leaf.
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1968). Clearly, the objective was to prevent loss to 
government (or maximize revenues) and not to ensure 
returns to tendu leaf pluckers. Most studies suggest 
that, in practice, irregularities continued under the state 
monopoly system (Lal and Dave 1991; Bhogal 2000).
Eventually, the plight of tendu leaf pluckers, who were 
getting a pittance throughout this period, caught the 
attention of at least one political party, which also did 
not benefit from the power of the tendu leaf contractor 
lobby and may have been concerned about the spread 
of Naxalism in eastern MP (DN 1989; Bhogal 2000). 
Thus, the government first created a state-level co-
operative federation in 1984 and then, in 1988–89, 
launched a process of co-operativizing the entire 
tendu leaf collection and sale process (Lal and Dave 
1991; Marothia 1992). Within a year, 1,947 Primary 
Minor Forest Produce Co-operative Societies (PCSs) 
were established across the then undivided MP, and 
clustered under 44 District Minor Forest Produce 
Unions (DUs) 10, with the state-level MFPFED as the 
apex body.11  The state increased the pluckers’ wages 
by 55% over 1988 (Bhogal 2000), and yet MFPFED 
made a profit of `290 crores, of which `150 crores was 
redistributed among tendu leaf pluckers as ‘incentive 
The emergence of the Jabalpur beedi industry at the turn of the century triggered the search for suitable 
beedi wrappers, culminating in the choice of the tendu 
leaf and its emergence as a highly valuable commercial 
product (Lal 2009). MP is thus the original site of the 
tendu leaf trade. 
During the pre-independence period and up to the 
mid-1960s, the Forest Department would auction 
tendu leaf collection rights at a division level and the 
contractors would then arrange for collecting the tendu 
leaf using local villagers as wage labourers. A significant 
amount of tendu leaf also grew on private lands and 
was disposed of as the landowner pleased. In 1964, 
citing ‘pilferage from government lands adjoining 
private lands’, and ‘exploitation of private tendu leaf 
producers’, the state government passed the Madhya 
Pradesh Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 
1964,9 which brought the sale and transport of all tendu 
leaf, including that grown on private lands, under the 
control of the government (hence commonly referred 
to as ‘nationalization’ of tendu leaf). The Act provided 
for government-appointed agents to procure the leaf 
and sell to pre-appointed purchasers across 1,826 leaf-
producing units in the state (Shrivastava and Choubey 
BRIEF HISTORY AND 
CURRENT OPERATION 
OF TENDU LEAF 
MARKETING IN MP
2
9  Madhya Pradesh Tendu Leaf (Regulation of Trade) Act, 1964
10 Although called District Unions, these bodies are constituted at the level of forest divisions.
11 Although the mandate of the MFP co-operatives included procurement of all NTFPs, and the state monopoly included seeds of sal (Shorea robusta), resin 
of kullu (Sterculia urens) and lac, the focus was primarily on tendu leaves.
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3. Plucking: The tendu leaf harvest begins sometime 
in May when the phad (the place where the tendu 
leaf is collected and dried) is ‘opened’. Tendu leaf 
pluckers, often entire families, leave early in the 
morning for leaf collection and return home in the 
afternoon to sort and bundle the leaves (50 leaves 
per bundle) and submit them at the phad by the 
evening. The Phad Munshi (collection centre clerk), 
who is an employee of the PCS, receives and counts 
the bundles and enters the amount in the plucker’s 
card. Each PCS sets up several phads, one in each 
village or group of villages under its jurisdiction, for 
ease of collection.
4. Post-harvest processing: The contractor (who has 
been awarded the contract for that particular lot) 
sends specialized labourers to dry and pack the 
leaves in the phad, after which the packed bags are 
taken to godowns (often owned by the MFPFED but 
rented to the contractors) and eventually sold in the 
market after being sorted and graded.
 
Figure 1. Tendu bush pruning in progress 
(All photos by R. Venkat Ramanujam)
wage’ (called ‘bonus’ in common parlance), with the rest 
being retained by the government as royalty. 
A change in government in 1990 resulted in suspension 
of the policy of distributing part of the profits to 
pluckers. However, this was resumed in 1995, and then 
in 1998, the state abolished royalties completely and 
implemented a policy of redistribution of the entire net 
profit, partly in the form of additional wages and partly 
as contributions to certain development funds. The 
fraction of profit distributed as additional wages was 
initially 50%, which was raised to 60% in 2006. The 
MFPFED has also implemented additional policies for 
the welfare of the pluckers, such as group insurance and 
scholarships for children of the pluckers. MFPFED also 
deals in two other ‘nationalized’ NTFPs, viz., sal seeds and 
kullu gum. More recently, it has launched the processing 
of herbal products and honey. However, the sale of tendu 
leaves is by far the most dominant business, constituting 
93% of the revenues in 2009–10.12 Following the 
separation of Chhattisgarh state from MP in 2000, MP is 
left with 1,066 PCSs, and today, these PCSs are organized 
into 61 District Unions (see Table 10 in Appendix 2).
A detailed description of the current structure, 
operation and official governance system of the 
MFPFED system is provided in Appendix 2. In brief, the 
system works, or is supposed to work,13  as follows. 
1. Tendering: MFPFED calls for tender bids for each 
PCS (or ‘lot’)14  in November of the year, i.e., six to 
seven months preceding the harvesting season. This 
system is called pre-harvest tendering.15 Prospective 
buyers have to satisfy certain conditions before they 
can bid. The tender notice is issued by MFPFED from 
Bhopal, but bids are opened and contracts awarded 
concurrently in three locations: Bhopal, Jabalpur 
and Rewa. The highest bidder for a particular lot 
generally secures the contract, and 8% of the bid 
amount is taken as security deposit so as to ensure 
that the buyer will buy the leaves from that lot in 
the coming season. However, the actual payments 
for the plucked leaves are made in four instalments 
beginning the following October (after the harvest 
has been completed).
2. Pruning: Pruning of tendu bushes is carried out in 
February–March, roughly 45–60 days prior to the 
harvest season, so as to encourage growth of tender 
leaves. Funds for this activity are supposed to come 
from a Forest Development Fund created out of the 
profits from tendu sale. 
12  Annual Report of the MP MFP Federation, 2009–10
13 We outline here the process as officially described, and indicate the field realities in later sections. See also (Bhogal 2000a).
14The ‘lot’ for which tender is called is usually identical to the PCS, except where the leaf production in one PCS is inadequate, in which case, two PCSs may 
be clubbed together to form a lot. Thus, 1,066 PCSs are currently aggregated into 937 lots.
 15Pre-harvest tendering was adopted in 2004, before which the system was post-harvest auctioning, and involved some risk since sale prices would be 
known much after collection had already been carried out and wages paid.
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‘bonus’, is made much later, typically 14–18 months 
later. It is calculated separately for each PCS and 
is set at 60% of the ‘net profits’, where profits are 
defined as receipts from sale of tendu leaves minus 
administrative costs. Four per cent of the net profits 
are transferred to the corpus of MFPFED, and the 
remaining 36% is equally divided between two 
funds – the Village Development Fund and Forest 
Development Fund (mentioned above).16  The 
collection and incentive wages are paid in proportion 
to the tendu leaves collected (or rather, the amount 
entered in each plucker’s card).
5. Payment to leaf pluckers: Payment for the collected 
leaves is made in two phases. A ‘collection wage’ 
is announced by MFPFED before the starting of the 
plucking season (with the decision actually being 
made by the state cabinet). This ‘wage’ is a rate or 
price to be paid per Standard Bag (SB) of leaves 
(i.e., 50,000 leaves), and is uniform across all PCSs. 
Payment as per this rate is made in cash within a few 
days of the plucker submitting the leaves at the phad. 
 The second part of the payment, formally called 
an ‘incentive wage’ but colloquially referred to as 
Figure 2. Plucking of tendu leaves in progress: from trees (left) and bushes (right)
Figure 3. Bundling of plucked leaves at home 
before taking them to the phad
Figure 4. Submitting bundles of plucked leaves 
at the phad to the Phad Munshi
16  The MFPFED website does not mention the 4% contribution to corpus, but this information was provided by a former Managing Director of the 
MFPFED. The website also does not explicitly talk about the two funds, but these terms were used by many officers we spoke to. As mentioned later, the 
management of this part of the profits is not very transparent.
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Divisional Forest Officer is the Prabandh Sanchalak 
(Managing Director). All DUs in turn elect nine 
members to the Board of Directors of the state-
level MFPFED, with another three being nominated 
by the government and six being ex-officio from 
the departments of forests, co-operatives, tribal 
welfare, and so on. The Chairperson of the Board 
of MFPFED is usually appointed by the Registrar 
and may be a minister of state or member of 
the legislative assembly (MLA). The day-to-day 
operations of the federation are handled by officers 
on deputation from the Forest Department (see 
www.mfpfederation.org for details). 
6. Cash flow: The pluckers are paid their collection 
wage within a few days of the harvest; whereas the 
payments by the contractor to the MFPFED are made 
over a period of several months after the harvest. 
Therefore, working capital is a crucial requirement. 
The MFPFED advances money to the PCSs for the 
payment of the collection wage and then recovers 
this advance from the payments received in 
instalments from the contractor (all payments being 
received centrally, and not by individual PCSs).
7. Functions across the three-tiers: The bye-laws of the 
three tiers of the co-operative marketing system 
 (PCS, DU and MFPFED) are worded in very broad 
terms,17 which do not give the real picture of which 
body performs what functions. In practice, as the 
above description indicates, the multi-village PCS 
conducts pruning and tendu leaf collection, and 
distributes the collection wage. The DU links the 
PCSs to the MFPFED as far as tendu leaf collection 
is concerned, and is involved in the auctioning of 
other NTFPs. The functions of the state-level MFPFED, 
as given in the bye-laws, are very broad and vague. 
However, in practice, the MFPFED conducts the 
auctions on behalf of all PCSs, handles security 
deposits, advances and contractor payments, comes 
up with the annual accounts for each PCS, sets the 
‘collection’ wage for the state as a whole and the 
‘incentive’ wage for each PCS. 
8. Governance of the PCS: All adults who collect tendu 
leaves are entitled to become members of the PCS 
upon the payment of a very nominal membership 
fee and share price. These members elect eleven 
members to a Prabandh Samiti (Executive Committee) 
for a term of five years, along with two members who 
are nominated by the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO). 
The Samiti is the governing body of the co-operative 
society. It is supposed to appoint the Prabandhak 
(manager) and the Phad Munshis. It is also supposed 
to arrange for actual sale of the tendu leaves (and 
other NTFPs) and decide on distribution of profits 
so obtained. It is expected to ensure scrutiny of 
accounts and prepare annual accounts and reports 
and present the same to the general body of the 
society.
9. Governance of the DU and the MFPFED: 
 The members of all Prabandh Samitis under 
one district or forest division elect, from among 
themselves, the ten-member board or Sanchalak 
Mandal of the DU, of which the corresponding 
17 For instance, ‘entering into commercial and financial transactions’ and ‘determining a pricing policy for commodities’ (MPMFPCF n.d.).
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3.1 
Criteria for assessing performance
The literature on marketing and co-operative marketing 
in general (Vergroesen 1989; Nilsson 2001; Zeuli et 
al. 2004) and the policy literature associated with 
the setting up of co-operatives for collection and 
marketing of NTFPs in India (Bawa et al., 1971) provide 
several rationales for setting up such co-operatives 
and therefore indicate what the expectations from 
them should be. These expectations have evolved from 
being purely economic ones of maximum gain to the 
NTFP collectors to also focusing on the question of 
empowerment of members, and (in the context of natural 
resource-based co-operatives) on ecological impact. 
Furthermore, in the context of a federation, the question 
of fair sharing of the burden of co-operation also 
becomes relevant. Thus, one may derive the following 
specific criteria under the four broad rubrics of efficiency, 
equity, sustainability and democratic governance:
1. Efficiency
a. Effectiveness: In setting up NTFP-marketing 
co-operatives, state governments in India 
How should we assess and understand the achievements of the MFPFED system in MP? 
The framework for any such study would consist of two 
parts. The assessment of outcomes would require a 
normative framework that specifies what a co-operative 
procurement and marketing system with a monopoly on 
a forest product should be expected to deliver, and how 
one would measure progress towards these normative 
goals. Further, the explanation of success or failure 
in achieving these goals would require a theoretical 
framework that would identify a potential set of factors 
likely to influence the co-operative system’s ability to 
deliver on these expectations. Using the literature on 
co-operative marketing and the MFPFED’s own stated 
goals, we discuss here what would be a reasonable set 
of criteria for assessing performance, indicate which 
ones we chose and why, and how each of them were 
operationalized. Finally, we discuss what theoretical 
framework may be used to explain high achievements 
or shortcomings (if any) along criteria.
CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK
3
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sustainability is not a stated objective of MFPFED. 
The matter of regulating harvesting practices is left to 
the Forest Department, which continues to ‘own’ and 
manage forest land and exert control on the ground. 
So, we focused on financial sustainability and only 
offer a few limited observations and summary of the 
debate on ecological sustainability.
4. Democratic governance: The essence of 
 co-operation is the voluntary association of 
individuals for conducting activities, controlled by 
them in a democratic manner (Dunn 1988; Österberg 
and Nilsson 2009). As mentioned earlier, the Sharma 
committee also lauded the MFPFED system for 
democratic decentralization. By adopting the 
 co-operative model to re-organize the tendu leaf 
trade, the MP government committed itself to 
decentralizing decision-making in favour of tendu 
leaf pluckers and promoting their empowerment. 
 The government further reiterated this position after 
the passage of the PESA by claiming that the MFPFED 
system amounts to transfer of rights and powers to 
the Gram Sabhas as required under PESA, which is a 
legislation regarding self-governance by Scheduled 
Tribe communities. Thus, self-governance of the 
 co-operatives by its members in a democratic manner 
should be a core expectation from this system.
3.2 
Assessing effectiveness, collector share and 
additional service delivery
Effectiveness in capturing better prices can be 
assessed in different ways. In a ‘before–after’ 
comparison, one would see whether prices were better 
after co-operativization than before. In a ‘with–without’ 
comparison, one would compare prices under the co-
operative model with those obtained in other models. 
In an ‘absolute’ comparison, one would examine what 
fraction of the final retail price of leaves sold to the 
beedi makers is captured by the co-operative, after 
deducting legitimate costs for processing, transport, 
wastage and marketing incurred by the tendu leaf 
contractor. The ‘before–after’ comparison would be 
truer to site conditions (since the same site is being 
examined over time), but it would be misleading if, 
for instance, product prices are rising or fluctuating 
because of reasons not related to co-operativization. 
Indeed, the market for tendu leaf has been quite 
volatile (Lal and Wilson 2012). On the other hand, 
have invoked the ‘middle-men exploiting NTFP 
collectors by offering them low prices’ as the main 
reason for setting up such co-operatives (see 
e.g., Bawa and others, 1971). Thus, the first and 
foremost objective of any NTFP marketing system, 
co-operative or otherwise, is to obtain the best 
possible price for the NTFP collectors.
b. Collector share and its timely distribution: 
Whatever price is obtained in the market, an 
efficient marketing system would ensure that most 
of this price is passed on to the collectors. This 
would mean minimizing administrative costs and 
‘profits’ to the co-operative.18 MFPFED also claims 
that the main objective was to ‘give benefits to 
forest dwellers in collection and trade of forest 
produce’.19 Thus, it is appropriate to investigate 
whether this is the case and whether the collectors 
are getting the maximum possible share in the 
selling price obtained by the co-operative. An 
associated aspect is whether the collector’s share 
is distributed in a timely manner.
c. Additional service delivery: In the context of co-
operatives such as MFPFED that take on additional 
non-economic or welfare tasks, such as insurance 
for tendu leaf pluckers and education scholarships 
for children of leaf pluckers, one needs to 
separately assess to what extent such tasks are 
being effectively carried out. 
2. Inter- and intra-PCS fairness: In a federation of 
co-operatives, it is possible that the burden of 
supporting the federation is unevenly distributed 
across the member co-operatives or that the benefits 
are unevenly shared. Thus, ‘inter-PCS fairness’ 
becomes an important criterion. Similarly, at the 
level of the PCS itself, the benefits must be fairly 
distributed, which in the case of a marketing co-
operative means that those who contribute the most 
produce and the best quality produce must get the 
highest returns. (Shah 1995).
3. Financial and ecological sustainability: For financial 
sustainability, any co-operative society must ensure 
that the manner in which operations are conducted 
do not result in continued losses and that it has the 
financial capital (working capital and reserves) to 
carry on operations in the future. Furthermore, for a 
co-operative that depends upon harvest of a forest 
product, managing harvest in a way that ensures 
continued availability of the product in the future 
should be a key objective. However, ecological 
18 Indeed, in the case of marketing co-operatives, the statutes limit them from making significant ‘profit’ by capping the dividend paid on share capital at a 
maximum of 6%
19 http://www.mfpfederation.org/Website/content/about_us.html
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the leaves are sold without processing in MP (and 
even the processing is done manually). The question 
of competition from other sellers does not arise, 
because virtually the entire tendu leaf resource in 
the state (other than a small amount of private tendu 
trees) is being controlled under this system. The 
only question is whether the money paid out to leaf 
pluckers is adequately recouped, or whether fluctuating 
prices or defaulting contractors cause losses, thereby 
jeopardizing the working of the co-operative. We 
assessed this by examining the financial record of 
MFPFED and the manner in which funds are paid out 
and recouped.
Assessing the ecological sustainability of tendu 
harvesting would be a major task, and as mentioned 
above, we neither had the wherewithal to carry out 
the required ecological studies, nor did ecological 
sustainability seem part of the mandate of the MFPFED 
system. Nevertheless, we did examine the trend in 
tendu leaf harvests to see if there were any systematic 
declines and also discussed the pros and cons of tendu 
leaf harvesting and management practices with tendu 
leaf pluckers and Forest Department officials to gain 
some idea of the challenges and debates involved.
3.5 
Assessing democratic governance
The essence of co-operation is the voluntary 
association of individuals for conducting activities of 
common interest and managing them democratically. 
By adopting the co-operative model to re-organize the 
tendu leaf trade, the MP government committed itself 
to decentralizing decision-making in favour of tendu 
leaf pluckers. The government further reiterated this 
position post-PESA by claiming that the MFPFED system 
amounts to transfer of rights and powers to the Gram 
Sabhas under PESA. While such transitions may take 
time, it would be fair to expect that over a 25-year 
period (1988 to 2013), the control of the co-operatives 
would reside with the pluckers or the Gram Sabhas as 
a whole, that they would choose office-bearers who 
would then organize pruning, collection and auctioning 
of the product. To estimate the progress made in this 
direction, we interviewed leaf pluckers, Phad Munshis 
and functionaries of the co-operative societies at 
primary, district and state levels. In the interviews with 
pluckers and office-bearers of primary co-operative 
societies, we specifically asked questions about 
whether they were aware of the democratic processes 
involved in running co-operatives (e.g., regular elections 
given that the entire state is under co-operative 
marketing, a ‘with–without’ comparison requires us 
to compare across states, which is complicated by 
variations in tendu leaf quality and processing levels. 
The absolute approach would require data on what the 
‘legitimate’ costs of the contractor might be. We shall 
present data using all three approaches and look for 
convergence between them. 
The collector share was the sum of the collection and 
incentive wages divided by the tender price for each 
PCS. This was compared with the collector share in 
other states and also examined over time. It was also 
broken down into administrative costs and ‘profit’, 
and the manner in which profit was distributed, was 
examined. The delay between pluckers receiving the 
first payment (collection wage) and receiving the final 
payment (incentive wage) and the difficulties (if any) 
in obtaining the final payment were also assessed.
The effectiveness of welfare schemes, viz., group 
insurance and scholarships for children of tendu leaf 
collectors, was assessed by looking at ground-level 
data on awareness about the schemes, and the smooth 
disbursement of the benefits. (We do not address the 
larger question of whether such schemes should be 
taken up at all and by whom and at what scale.)
3.3 
Assessing inter- and intra-PCS equity
Within a primary co-operative society, if benefits are 
distributed in proportion to produce contributed, one 
may say that the primary requirement of intra-PCS 
equity is met. However, given that the primary 
co-operative societies are further federated, the 
question of whether one society is forced to cross-
subsidize another is something that also requires 
attention. This can happen if inter-PCS variations 
in leaf quality are not factored into the returns 
accruing to the members. Secondary data on the 
manner in which auctions were conducted and wage 
and bonus amounts distributed were examined to 
explore this aspect.
3.4 
Assessing financial and ecological 
sustainability
The marketing of tendu leaves does not involve any 
major investments in equipment or fixed capital, since 
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conditions, and political support, and the ‘internal’ design 
or structuring of collective action (Shah 1995). 
Designs are, however, not created in a vacuum. 
Co-operatives occupy a space earlier occupied by 
someone else, and therefore their creation and 
design are the outcome of tussles between political 
forces representing various interest groups. Political 
economy helps us explain (within limits) why particular 
institutional designs were adopted (or not adopted), by 
asking whose interests were served. This is particularly 
relevant in this case where the co-operatives were not 
formed bottom-up but were created by the state, and 
in whose governance, the state continues to play a 
major role.
of office-bearers, regular general body meetings). 
Office-bearers were asked when and how they were 
elected, the level of autonomy from above, and their 
accountability towards the general body.
3.6 
Explaining outcomes
What would explain adequate or inadequate outcomes 
on the above dimensions? We start with a combination 
of institutional analysis and political economy 
frameworks similar to the one used in Lélé and Rao 
(1996). Co-operatives are collective action institutions, 
and the institutional analysis literature posits that the 
performance of such institutions depends upon two sets 
of factors: conditions ‘external’ to the institution itself, 
including nature of the resource, member interest, market 
Figure 5. Location of districts of Madhya Pradesh state within which Primary Co-operative Societies were 
sampled (Bhopal is the state capital, where MFPFED is located). (Map prepared by ATREE Ecoinformatics Lab.)
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interviews were conducted with Prabandhaks, District 
Union clerks, and elected representatives across the 
study area. Participant observation, which included 
accompanying leaf pluckers to the forest, observing the 
tying up of bundles, and their deposition at the phad, 
was carried out during the 2011 collection season in 
three PCS: one each in Betul, Sagar, and Umaria districts. 
Informal interviews were conducted at this time with 
the contractors’ staff employed in tendu leaf curing and 
processing at the phad. 
To understand the functioning at the state-level and 
the role of the Forest Department, 22 forest officials, 
ranging from forest guards to a retired Principal Chief 
Conservator of Forest closely associated with MFPFED 
were interviewed. Seven tendu leaf contractors and 
two contractor-turned-beedi-manufacturers were 
interviewed to understand the tendu leaf trade from 
the point of view of intermediaries and end-product 
makers. Eleven other interviews were conducted, 
covering journalists, social activists, NGO workers, 
academicians, researchers and ex-MLAs. Secondary data 
was gathered from the PCS and District Unions, and the 
MFP Federation. Government orders and other archival 
materials were obtained from advocate, Anil Garg.
F ieldwork for the study was conducted from 2010–12 in six districts of MP: Betul, Dindori, Umaria, Sagar, 
Vidisha and Sehore. These districts were chosen as 
representing regions with high tendu leaf availability 
but varying adivasi fraction in the population and 
varying access to beedi manufacturing units, using 
the 2001 Population Census data for Madhya Pradesh, 
interviews with MP FD officials, and initial pilot visits. 
We focused particularly on Betul, Dindori, and Umaria, 
where adivasis comprise 40–65% of the population, 
and Sagar, which is a major site of the beedi-making 
industry. Twenty-five PCSs were covered across eight 
District Unions: West Betul, North Betul, Dindori, North 
Sagar, South Sagar, Sehore, Umaria and Vidisha. 
In these PCSs, focus group discussions were conducted 
with leaf pluckers, including separate discussions 
with women leaf pluckers. Gram Sabha meetings were 
used to interact with leaf pluckers. Household data 
on socio-economic status and NTFP collection was 
gathered from 125 households across four villages. 
Ten Phad Munshis were interviewed to understand 
the process of procurement, variations and key issues 
at the level of the collection centre. For an overview 
at the level of the PCS as well as the District Union, 
METHODS
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We present here our findings regarding the four dimensions along which we would like to assess 
the performance of the MFPFED system. 
5.1
Effectiveness, collector share and additional 
service delivery
5.1.1 Effectiveness
The time-series of average sale price received and wages 
and bonuses paid is presented in Table 1. As mentioned 
earlier, the MFPFED system performed well in its first 
year of operations (1989), when prices obtained and 
wages paid were much higher than the previous (pre-
co-operativization) year, as described in section 2. It 
continued to fare well for several years, as sale prices 
rose slowly, but then declined in 2001 and remained 
relatively stagnant after that till 2005, and wages grew 
even more slowly (see Figure 6). Prices began to increase 
rapidly after 2005, but data from Odisha state20 indicate 
that this trend prevailed there too and therefore was 
most likely the result of overall trends in the tendu leaf 
market. It is thus hard to conclude anything from just 
looking at sale prices in MP alone.
PERFORMANCE
5
20 B. Lakshmi. 2012. Value-chain analysis of kendu leaf in Odisha. Unpublished internship report, ATREE. 
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To correct for any bias due to leaf quality, which is 
supposed to be better in Odisha and in Gadchiroli 
district of Maharashtra compared to MP as a whole,22  
we then examined the prices obtained in the PCSs 
with the best quality leaves. In our sample of 25 PCSs, 
Bandhvavra PCS in Umaria district obtained the highest 
tender price of `2,557 in 2011. Even this price is 
substantially lower than the average of `3,180 
in Gadchiroli or `3,820 averaged across Odisha. 
Finally, we also estimated the share of the tender 
price in the ‘final sale price’ obtained by the tendu leaf 
contractor from the beedi manufacturer. The exact final 
sale price is not officially known and not easily divulged. 
To better assess how well MFPFED is performing in 
terms of obtaining the best possible price, we compared 
the average sale price obtained by the MFPFED system 
with the average sale price in Odisha as a whole and 
Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra for which data were 
available.21 We found that the average sale price of 
tendu leaves in MP is significantly lower than the 
average sale price in the other two states (see row 4 in 
Table 2), even after correcting for processing margins 
in Odisha (where the government agency itself does 
sorting and bagging before auctioning the leaf). Further, 
this is not peculiar to the year 2011: in 2006, the 
average sale price in MP was `842, while in Odisha
it was about `2,250 (after deducting processing costs, 
as in Table 2). 
Table 2:  Comparison of sale price obtained by government for tendu leaves in three states
State
Structure
Average final sale price 
of processed leaves in 
2011 (`/SB)
Average final sale price 
of unprocessed leaves 
in 2011 (`/SB)
Average return to 
pluckers in 2011 
(`/SB)
% to plucker of sale 
price of processed 
(unprocessed) leaf
Madhya Pradesh
Co-op and bonus; 
pre-harvest 
tendering of each 
lot/ PCS
2,617 (estimated)
1,817 (actual)
1,226
47% (67%)
Maharashtra (Gadchiroli district)
No co-op, but bonus, pre-harvest 
tendering of each lot
3,980 (estimated)
3,179 (actual)
2,867
72% (90%)
Odisha 
No co-op, no bonus, 
post-harvest auction of 
aggregated and processed 
leaves
4,320 (actual)
3,820 (estimated)
730
17% (19%)
Notes
1. SB = Standard Bag of 50,000 leaves. 
2. Figures for Maharashtra represent average of three lots of varying quality from Gadchiroli district. 
3. Estimate of selling price of processed leaves in MP and Maharashtra assumes a `800 markup (that 
includes `400 as processing costs).
4. Source of data: Records of respective state tendu leaf marketing organizations, and field data collected by 
authors and colleagues in Odisha and Maharashtra.
21 Based on data collected by Safia Aggarwal, ATREE.
22 Based on interviews with wholesale dealers of tendu leaf. 
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Nevertheless, extended conversations with tendu leaf 
contractors in six District Union jurisdictions gave some 
indication of the final sale price, which is provided in 
Table 3. Even if one allows `400/SB as processing and 
transport costs for the tendu leaf contractor (which 
is 14–20% of the final sale price), we see that the 
contractor’s margins are at least 20% and often 26% 
of the final price or a ~40% markup on the unprocessed 
leaf price. It should be noted that contractors are likely 
to give us underestimates of the prices at which they 
sell their product. Thus, the actual margins are likely to 
be higher, around 30–40%. This is also corroborated 
by data we obtained on final processed leaf sale 
prices from dealers in Bangalore, Maharashtra and 
Chhattisgarh. In short, whether one compares the tender 
price of unprocessed or processed leaves across regions 
with similar leaf quality, or one compares the tender 
price obtained by MFPFED with the price at which 
the ‘tenderer’ (the tendu leaf contractor) is able to sell 
the leaf to beedi makers, it seems clear that the MFPFED 
is at best moderately effective in obtaining the best 
possible prices for tendu leaf. 
Table 3. Average District Union-level tender price as a proportion of the estimated ‘final sale price’ for the year 2011
Figure 7. Sale price of processed and unprocessed tendu 
leaves across states 
(Source of data: Records of respective state tendu leaf 
marketing organizations, and field data collected by 
authors and colleagues in Odisha and Maharashtra.)
District Union
North Betul
West Betul
South Betul
North Sagar
South Sagar
Umaria
Average tender 
price in 2011 
(`/SB)
2,126
2,386
2,196
1,521
1,469
2,065
Estimated final sale 
price to beedi makers 
(`/SB)
3,483
3,483
3,483
2,522*
2,522*
3,360
Average tender price 
as proportion of final 
sale price 
61%
68%
63%
60%
58%
61%
Notes
The average tender prices were obtained from the MFPFED website. The average sale price was calculated by 
estimating the final sale prices for different grades of leaf from interviews with contractors and beedi makers, 
and applying them to quantities of each grade sold in each DU, after allowing for a 5% loss of leaf between 
procurement and final sale.
* The final sale prices in Sagar tend to be artificially low because local beedi manufacturers are themselves tendu 
leaf contractors, and so they indicate a low price for the leaf and capture the margin in the beedi business. 
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(average)
Processing margins
Sale price of unprocessed leaves
2,617
3,980
4,320
Maharashtra
(Gadchiroli 
District)
Odisha 
(average)
0
500
2,000
1,000
2,500
3,500
4,500
1,500
3,000
4,000
5,000
State
Sa
le
 p
ri
ce
 in
 2
01
1 
(`
)
17
PCS. This is in spite of the fact that the forest officers, 
who play significant roles as Prabandh Sanchalak at the 
DU level and nodal officer at the PCS level, only receive 
token honoraria. In comparison, administrative costs in 
Maharashtra, which has a much lower turnover, have 
been fixed at 15% of the royalty amount since 2005,23 
which works out to only about 7–8% of the total income 
(i.e., royalty plus collection wage, see MFD 2012a), a 
level that MP has only now begun to approach.
Even though administrative costs are now low, the 
plucker is receiving only about 66% of the average 
tender price (see Table 1, column 9, and also Table 4). 
The lower share in MP is the direct consequence of the 
MFPFED policy of returning only 60–68% of the so-
called net profits (tender price minus collection wage 
minus administrative costs) as bonus (i.e., incentive 
wage). The rest (32–40% of the tender price) is diverted 
to the corpus and the two development funds. 
When compared to other states, MP is somewhere in 
the middle in terms of fraction of tender price officially 
given to the pluckers. On the one hand, Odisha pays no 
bonus, whatsoever, extracting all the surplus in the form 
of royalty, commission and taxes, and the collector share 
in the final sale price of unprocessed leaf is estimated 
to be only 19% (see Table 2). Similarly, Rajasthan also 
extracts royalty, and does not share profits with the 
pluckers (although there is a provision for doing so), 
resulting in a plucker share of 54% of the unprocessed 
5.1.2
Collector share
The next question is to what extent the prices obtained 
from the co-operative marketing of tendu leaves reach 
the pluckers. At the outset, it is important to note that, 
in the 1989–98 period, there was an inherent tension 
between the objective of maximizing state royalties and 
that of maximizing returns to pluckers. The suspension 
of the bonus system between 1990 and 1994 is 
a reflection of this tension. Once the government 
dropped the objective of collecting royalties in 1998, 
one would expect that there would be a full sharing of 
the sale price. However, closer examination indicates a 
significant and multi-dimensional gap between tender 
prices and returns to the pluckers.
The first gap occurs due to administrative costs. The 
magnitude of and trend in these costs is provided in 
Table 1. While administrative costs are inevitable, the 
initial period of MFPFED, right up to 2005, was clearly 
characterized by bloated administrative costs (31% of 
the tender price). Subsequently, the administrative cost 
margins have decreased to 7–14% of the tender price, 
possibly because the tender price itself has increased 
post-2005, so that a lower percentage is required to 
cover the relatively fixed administrative costs. 
In absolute terms, the administrative costs are about 
`50 crores annually, i.e., averaging around `5 lakhs per 
Table 4. Total returns to the leaf pluckers as a proportion of the tender price for the year 2010 for select sampled PCSs
District Union
N. Betul
N. Sagar
S. Sagar
Umaria
PCS
Dhar
Shahpur
Bhangarh
Bara
Arjuni
Nanhi Deori
Bandhwawara
Kohka
Tender 
price (`/SB)
2,129
1,908
1,632
1,009
1,289
958
2,565
1,960
Collection 
wage (`/SB)
650
650
650
650
650
650
650
650
Incentive wage 
(bonus) (`/SB)
709
590
132
No bonus
230
44
956
629
Total 
returns (`)
1,359
1,240
782
650
880
694
1,606
1,279
Total returns as 
% of tender price
64%
65%
48%
64%
69%
72%
63%
65%
23 The tendering system in Maharashtra is different from that in MP, in that the contractors only bid the royalty amount, and pay the ‘collection wage’ 
separately and directly to the pluckers. Hence, 15% of the royalty amount works out to about 7–8% of the total (royalty + collection wage), which would 
 be equal to the tender price in MP.
(Source: Data collected from PCS offices.)
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barely doubled. In 2001, it was `400 per SB; by 2012, it 
had merely risen to `750 (see Figure 6). In comparison, 
Chhattisgarh state had declared a collection wage of 
`700 in 2010 itself and raised it to `800 in 2011 and 
`1,100 in 2012. 
Second, the time period between the two payments 
is unacceptably long. Tendu leaves are collected during 
May–June. Drying and bagging is over in June. The 
contractors can easily be asked to pay up all their dues 
within two months and all calculations can be finished 
by October or so. It should therefore be possible to 
distribute the bonus by Diwali. MFPFED officials insist, 
however, that smaller contractors cannot manage the 
cash flow; they can only pay their dues to the PCS/
MFPFED after they have, in turn, received payments from 
beedi manufacturers. However, this means that the cost 
of the tendu leaf contractors’ working capital is being 
borne by the tendu leaf pluckers! 
MFPFED also advanced another reason: the need to 
complete the societies’ audited accounts, which only 
happens after 31 March, the end of the financial year. 
However, the only reason to wait for full accounts is to 
estimate the administrative cost, which (after twenty-
five years of operation) is surely quite well-estimated. 
As discussed earlier and seen from the last column of 
Table 1, administrative costs have been below 17% of 
the tender price for the last several years. The practice 
in many other co-operative societies is to estimate the 
administrative costs in advance, deduct a flat rate from 
the tender price, and return the remaining amount to 
the collectors soon after the buyer has paid up (e.g., 
arecanut co-operatives observed by the first author in 
Uttara Kannada district, Karnataka, or the Gujarat milk 
co-operatives). This also forces them to keep an eye on 
administrative costs. However, this practice has not been 
followed here.
Furthermore, in practice, there are major deficiencies 
even in the payment of the collection wage and the 
bonus. In many of the PCSs we studied, the pluckers 
complained of the Phad Munshi manipulating accounts 
to the detriment of the pluckers. For instance, in 
Chapwaar Village under the Nighori PCS of Dindori, 
leaf pluckers were reportedly paid only `550/- per 
Standard Bag in 2010, although the collection wage 
leaf price. On the one hand, Maharashtra returns 100% 
of the so-called net profit in the form of bonus payments 
to the collectors, a policy implemented starting 2006 
(MFD 2012b), which amounts to 90% of the price paid 
by the contractor for unprocessed leaf. Clearly, MP is 
doing a better job than Odisha or Rajasthan, but could 
do better if it did not impose the development ‘taxes’.
Does the development fund money indirectly return 
to the pluckers? On the MFPFED website, it is mentioned 
that the 20% that goes to the Village Development 
Fund can also be distributed in cash to the pluckers. 
However, we did not find a single instance in any of the 
25 sampled PCSs of such disbursement actually taking 
place.24  Moreover, a village development fund, 
if distributed, would go to all villagers, not to pluckers 
in proportion to the leaves they plucked. Finally, 
although the government order25 on this distribution 
specifies that both the funds are to be spent by the PCS 
as per the directions of the Forest Department and the 
MFPFED respectively, none of the PCS office-bearers that 
we interviewed even knew about the two funds or how 
they are managed. No details regarding the revenues 
and utilization of these funds could be obtained from 
the MFPFED either. Thus, this policy effectively imposes 
a 40% ‘tax’ on the so-called net profits from tendu leaf 
production (if one assumes that the collection is just the 
minimal return to their labour). 
In addition to the quantum of return, there is also a 
question of timing. First, the ratio between the first 
payment (collection wage) and the second payment 
(bonus) is unfairly and unnecessarily low. The average 
tender price in 2012 was `2,433 per SB, and this price 
was known beforehand, since (as explained earlier) 
the system is a pre-harvest tendering system. So, 
nothing prevented MFPFED from declaring a first 
payment (collection wage) of at least 75% of the tender 
price obtained in that PCS, which would on average be 
more than `1,800 per SB. Instead, the collection wage 
was set at `750 per SB. For areas with good quality 
leaves, the collection wage is hardly one-third of the 
tender price (see Table 4). Indeed, it appears that, over 
time, the collection wage fraction has declined: while 
the average price realized by the MFP Federation has 
increased nearly five-fold from `523 to `2,433 per 
SB between 2001 and 2012, the collection wage has 
24An earlier order specified that only 50% of profits would be shared as incentive wage; there was provision for another up to 30% to also be shared as 
incentive wage if the PCS so wished (G.O. No.F-26/8/97/10-3 dt.8 May 1998). However, this was also never implemented.
25 G.O.No. 303/3139/10-3/2005 dt. 31.1.2006 issued by Secretary, Forest Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh.
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in the payment of incentive wages or ‘bonus’.26  A brief 
overview of the experience of leaf pluckers with regard 
to the receipt of bonus is provided in Table 5. In a few 
PCSs, where activist groups are present, the bonus 
payments are carried out properly; in many others, 
there are irregularities. Women leaf pluckers in villages 
under the Karanjia PCS in Dindori, and the Pali PCS in 
Umaria were especially vociferous in articulating this 
problem. Often the bonus was paid at the Range Office, 
and villagers living in distant villages spent an entire 
day travelling to collect it, leading to the loss of a day’s 
wages. At times, they had to make repeated visits. In 
the districts of Dindori and Umaria, where a substantial 
number of leaf pluckers are illiterate, there was little 
awareness about either the collection wage rate or the 
bonus rate. Consequently, irregularities in the payment 
of wages were higher. However, the presence of social 
activists often had the effect of lowering the extent of 
irregularities. Thus, fewer complaints of irregularities in 
payment of remuneration were heard from villages in 
the Dhar PCS of Betul or the Kohka PCS of Umaria. 
Finally, it must be noted that the operation of PCSs in 
was `650/- for that year. Meanwhile, in Sans Village 
under the Chouri PCS of Umaria, leaf pluckers were 
yet to receive collection cards more than a week into 
the collection season in 2011. In the previous year, 
the collection wages here had been disbursed by 
the Nodal Officer who illegally deducted `40/- 
for each person on grounds of payment for nistari 
(subsistence) forest use. 
Also, across the study area, a common complaint was 
the deliberate under-recording of daily collection at 
the phad. Leaf pluckers claimed that the Phad Munshi 
would deliberately reject some leaf bundles on grounds 
of quality but later enter them into the records of 
a relative or friend with whom they would split the 
wages of the excess bundles upon payment. Equally 
common were complaints about delayed payment of 
the collection wage – at times up to one month after 
submitting the leaves to the phad. All these complaints 
resonate with the observations from a study conducted 
more than a decade ago (Bhogal 2000).
Similarly, significant irregularities are also to be found 
Table 5. Status of ‘bonus’ disbursement across select District Unions
District Union
North Betul
Dindori 
North Sagar  
South Sagar 
Umaria
PCS sampled
Dhar
Karanjia and 
Nighori
Hirapur
Arjuni and Kesli
Chouri and Pali
Kohka
Status of ‘bonus’ disbursement
Few complaints. Presence of Shramik Adivasi Sangathan (SAS) 
activists. Relatively higher levels of awareness.  
Complaints of non-receipt of bonus. Where bonus is received, 
leaf collectors are unable to say if they received full amount 
due to lack of literacy. Widespread belief that full amount is 
not paid. Low levels of awareness.
No bonus declared in several PCSs. Considerable irregularities 
in others. Bonus denied to leaf pluckers who had collected 
less than one Standard Bag (50,000 leaves) in a season. 
Leaf pluckers told that they need to show collection cards of 
the last three years to collect bonus.
Low levels of awareness. Could not say if full bonus amount 
was received since the payment was made long after the 
collection. Could not quote correct bonus rate. In Chouri, 
Nodal Officer (Deputy Range Officer) takes a cut on collection 
wages for allowing ‘nistar’.
Few complaints. Presence of activists of Rashtriya Yuva 
Sangathan.
(Source: Interviews conducted by the authors)
26Even though the distribution of bonus is often carried out with much fanfare (see section 6.2).
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the tender price going to the pluckers (with 7% going to 
administrative costs), only about 66% is going to them, 
and that too in a highly staggered manner with fair 
amount of leakages, especially in the second (bonus) 
payment. Maharashtra, which moved to the zero-royalty 
policy much later (2004–05), is now far ahead of MP in 
terms of the fraction and the absolute amounts reaching 
the pluckers, although delays and leakages probably 
exist there too. Also, the welfare schemes set up by 
MFPFED sound good on paper but their implementation 
leaves much to be desired.
5.2
Equity within and across PCSs
The operations of the PCS are conducted by paid 
professionals – whether the Prabandhak or the Phad 
Munshi, or the forest guard/deputy range officer. As we 
shall see below, the Prabandh Samiti does not have to 
do much work. Further, the returns to the pluckers are 
in proportion to the tendu leaves they contribute to 
the phad. To that extent, there are few major inequities 
within PCSs, although irregularities in payment of the 
bonus mean that some members receive their full 
return while others do not. 
Between PCSs, there is, on paper, no room for 
unfairness. The tender for each PCS is called 
independently, thereby suggesting that PCSs with 
better quality leaves can obtain better prices. Also, 
their accounts are supposed to be maintained 
separately, which means each PCS secures its own 
rate of bonus in proportion to the tender price. While 
this is supported by data in part of the field area, 
we discovered that in Sagar District this was not the 
case. A glance at Table 4 shows that in Bara PCS of 
North Sagar district, no bonus was paid in 2010 even 
though the tender price was much higher than the 
collection wage. More details are provided in Table 
14 and Table 15 in Appendix 3. From Table 14, it is 
evident that bonus was frequently not paid in the 
Hirapur, Bara and Bhangarh PCSs of North Sagar 
District Union during 2006–11, despite the tender 
price in these PCSs being sufficiently high to allow for 
the distribution of a small incentive wage (see Table 
13). Similarly, data in Table 15 indicate the erratic 
distribution of bonus in the Tada, Arjuni, and Nanhi 
Deori PCSs of South Sagar District Union. 
When asked about the non-payment of bonus in Sagar 
district, officials responded that it was because the PCSs 
were not making profits. It was indeed the case (as can 
Sagar district is more murky because there were several 
reports of a ‘black market’ where tendu pluckers sell 
leaves directly to beedi manufacturers (many of whom 
are located in Sagar district itself) bypassing the whole 
MFPFED process. We have provided some details of 
this admittedly difficult-to-document phenomenon 
in Appendix 3, which suggest that pluckers in such 
pockets might be getting lower than the overall returns 
obtained elsewhere.
5.1.3
Additional service delivery
In terms of the functioning of the welfare schemes, we 
found several deficiencies. The group insurance scheme 
has been in operation since 1991. According to the MFP 
Federation website, more than 2,07,000 claims have 
been settled between 1991–92 and 2010–11 with 
a total payout of `82 crores in the period. However, 
despite two decades in operation, awareness about the 
insurance scheme remains limited. Barely a dozen of 
the 125 leaf-plucking households surveyed in Dindori, 
Umaria and Betul reported even passing knowledge of 
the insurance scheme. In Sagar, the level of awareness 
appeared slightly higher. On the whole, awareness of 
the insurance scheme was connected to having family 
or professional links with the Forest Department, 
the PCS Prabandhak or the Phad Munshi. However, 
families who had filed claims reported having to pay 
the Phad Munshi or PCS Prabandhak to forward their 
case. Senior NTFP traders in Dindori and tendu leaf 
contractors in Sagar and Betul praised the idea behind 
the insurance scheme but believed that it was misused 
to file fraudulent claims with the connivance of PCS 
Prabandhaks and lower-rung forest employees. 
Another ambitious welfare scheme, the Eklavya Shiksha 
Yojana, was introduced by the MFP Federation in 
November 2010. The scheme provides scholarships 
to children of leaf pluckers undergoing high school 
education or attending technical or graduate-level 
courses. In the course of fieldwork during 2011–12, 
information about the scheme had percolated down 
to lower rungs of the Forest Department, but elected 
representatives of the PCS and District Unions were 
unaware of it.
In summary, the MFPFED system is moderately 
effective in obtaining the best price for tendu leaves, 
but poor at transferring these returns to the pluckers. 
The elimination of royalty payments to the state 
government in 1998 was celebrated with much fanfare 
as a highly progressive measure, but in place of 93% of 
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the MFPFED system as a whole has been free of losses, 
even though, as mentioned in the previous section, a 
few PCSs have incurred losses.
One risk, however, cannot be eliminated, which is the 
possibility that no bids are received for a particular 
unit/PCS. This may happen in places where the amount 
of tendu leaf on offer is small to begin with, or it may 
happen due to collusion between bidders. In such a 
situation, an individual PCS would have no option but 
to call off tendu leaf collection. However, the MFPFED 
appears to resort to risk-sharing across PCSs. It (the 
state-level agency) purchases the tendu leaf from 
such (tender-less) PCSs at the collection wage, and 
then tries to sell it later on, presumably to protect the 
livelihoods of the collectors in those PCSs. This has 
been done several times in some PCSs in Sagar district. 
If the post-harvest sale works out, this should be a 
no-profit-no-loss affair, given how much lower than the 
market price the collection wage has been. However, 
our investigations in Sagar indicated that in most such 
cases, MFPFED has incurred losses.27 As a result, it 
appears to have denied the distribution of bonus to 
other profitable PCSs in the DU in order to cover the 
losses. This is clearly an inefficient, non-transparent 
and unfair system. However, the number of instances of 
failure to procure tender bids is rather small when the 
state is considered as a whole.
Overall, therefore, it appears that the MFPFED system 
is financially sustainable. It is not accumulating losses, 
nor is it being subsidized by the state in cash (although 
some in-kind subsidy is provided in the form of the time 
of forest officials at the divisional and lower levels). 
Nor is it incurring debts from any other source. In fact, 
over the years, MFPFED has built up a large corpus and 
diversified its activities into aromatic plants. Officials in 
the Bhopal office proudly point this out as the outcome 
of prudent financial management.
While, as mentioned earlier, it was not possible to 
assess ecological sustainability in any detail, we 
observed the following. On the one hand, the trend 
in total sale of tendu leaves by MFPFED state during 
2000–12 (starting after the separation of Chhattisgarh) 
is shown in Figure 8. It does not show any systematic 
decline in the amount collected/sold.28 This suggests 
that tendu leaf harvesting has not created any grave 
sustainability questions for the tendu leaf resource 
itself over this period. 
On the other hand, the ecological impact of tendu leaf 
harvesting on the rest of the forest has been a matter 
of much debate between the Forest Department, the 
be seen from Table 17) that in some PCSs, no tender 
price was offered or what was offered was significantly 
below the collection wage. However, the PCSs we have 
mentioned do not fit into this category. When this was 
pointed out to the officials, we did not receive a clear 
response. The overall impression given was that though 
individual PCSs may have made a ‘profit’, if other PCSs 
in the division were making a loss, then the costs 
would be shared across all PCSs in the division and 
hence ‘profitable’ PCSs could not declare a bonus. This 
appears to be a rather unfair cross-subsidy, and that too 
(as the next sub-section shows) without any process of 
obtaining consent from the concerned PCS members.
5.3
Financial and ecological sustainability
For the first 16 years of its existence, MFPFED operated 
under a post-harvest auctioning system, where the 
leaves were procured, processed and then auctioned. 
In this system, there is some chance of making a loss 
if the tendu leaf price drops suddenly after the initial 
payment has been made to collectors (due to a glut 
in production, for example) or if the post-harvest 
processing fails for some reason. For instance, in 2001, 
unseasonal rains meant that a large fraction of the 
tendu leaves was damaged and could not be sold, but 
since collection wages had already been paid, MFPFED 
incurred a loss.
MFPFED, however, moved to a pre-harvest tendering 
system in 2004, wherein prices are decided through 
auctions held six months prior to the actual harvest, 
and 8% of the tender amount (tender price × estimated 
harvest) is collected as a security deposit from the 
chosen contractor for each PCS. As shown in section 
5.1.2, the collection wage is always less than 50% 
of the tender price. Under these conditions, the risk 
involved in post-harvest processing and market 
fluctuations between the time of bidding for the tender 
(November/December) and the actual sale (after the 
following July) are borne by the tendu leaf contractor, 
and the system is almost riskless as far as the PCS/
MFPFED is concerned, unless the contractor defaults 
after the harvest has taken place. We did not hear of 
any contractor default cases, suggesting that this is not 
a major problem (probably because the security deposit 
collected and the contractor screening process are 
adequate). Also, with the controls exerted by MFPFED, 
there do not seem to have been any cases of internal 
mismanagement of funds either at the local or state 
levels. Apart from the weather-induced loss in 2001, 
27 There are also unsubstantiated reports of corruption in this system: some contractors supposedly bribe Forest Department staff and ensure that the 
leaves are sold to them at very low prices.
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in leaf quality. Again, the ecosystem-wide impacts of 
these constraints on pruning are unclear.
5.4
Democracy and empowerment
A Forest Department official claimed that the milk 
co-operatives of Gujarat had served as the model when 
the blueprint for MFP co-operatives in MP was prepared 
in the late 1980s. However, a closer examination of 
their functioning shows that they are a far cry from 
the milk co-operatives in terms of being bottom-up, 
member-driven and member-controlled collective 
action institutions.
5.4.1
Poor levels of awareness among leaf pluckers
To begin with, we assessed whether leaf pluckers (the 
general body of the co-operative societies) knew of the 
existence of the co-operative society and its functioning. 
We found that an overwhelming majority of leaf pluckers 
remain ignorant of the very existence of the co-operative 
societies. Our household surveys and interviews showed 
that entire villages of leaf pluckers believed that they 
sold tendu leaf to the Forest Department. Persons linked 
to the Phad Munshi or PCS Prabandhak had a vague 
leaf pluckers, the contractors, and ecologists. The 
traditional practice is to use pruning and fire, both of 
which are meant to ‘injure’ the tendu leaf plant and 
thereby stimulate the formation of new leaves that 
would be suitable for beedi-making (Hunter 1981). 
Pruning also serves to maintain the plant as a shrub, 
rather than allowing it to grow naturally into a tree, so 
as to facilitate easy harvest by pluckers, especially by 
women and children. Tendu shrubs maintained in this 
manner form relatively monocultural patches on the 
edges of forests in the tendu leaf growing regions (see 
Figure 1 and Figure 2). So, the structure of the forest 
ecosystem certainly changes on its fringes. The Forest 
Department claims, however, that the fire spreads and 
destroys the rest of the forest. It therefore insists that 
the PCSs ensure that no fire is used in areas where the 
PCS members carry out most of their leaf plucking. 
During our field work, we observed that this ban is 
implemented fairly strongly. The Forest Department 
officials highlight the successful implementation of this 
ban as one of the key successes of MFPFED system. 
However, it is not clear whether fire is really damaging 
or is part of the natural ecosystem process in these dry 
deciduous forests. Pruning is also not allowed inside 
Reserved Forests. Moreover, pruning is carried out 
by the PCS and not the tendu leaf contractors as was 
the case earlier, and therefore is supposed to be less 
damaging to the forest, whereas tendu leaf contractors 
complain about inadequate pruning leading to a decline 
Figure 8. Trend in quantity of tendu leaves harvested in MP (Source: MFPFED)
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28There is no significant unsold amount at the end of each year, and hence the amount harvested is the same as the amount sold.
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members had been enrolled during the drive conducted 
by the MFP Federation during the formation of the 
primary co-operatives in the late 1980s. 
The cost of enrolment of `11/- per member was 
borne by the MFP Federation and recovered from the 
collection wages paid in the first year of procurement. 
It is not clear if any further enrolment has occurred 
since then. For instance, approximately 200 individuals 
were enrolled as members of the Kohka PCS, Umaria, 
at the time of inception in 1989 with no subsequent 
updating or addition. 
In theory, not updating the membership rolls should 
have serious consequences: non-members would not be 
allowed to collect leaves and market them through the 
PCS, and non-members would not be able to participate 
in general body meetings or vote in the society elections. 
However, in practice, membership in the PCS appears to 
be irrelevant. Not being a member is not a disadvantage 
because anyone can bring leaves to the phad for sale. 
Further, being a member confers no advantages because 
notion of the ‘Samiti’ but could not state its purpose 
or activities beyond the collection of the tendu leaf. 
Table 6 shows that the levels of awareness about basic 
facts related to the co-operative societies and the 
procurement of the tendu leaf remain abysmally low. 
The awareness levels were even lower among women 
in Dindori and Umaria districts, with none of them being 
able to acknowledge the existence of the primary 
co-operative or even state the collection wage correctly.  
5.4.2
Membership and elections
We then looked for the membership rolls in each PCS. 
However, none of the PCSs covered in this study were 
able to produce a list of their members or state the 
exact number of members on their rolls. According 
to the primary society bye-laws, any leaf plucker 
or NTFP collector above the age of 18 years is entitled 
to become a member of the PCS by purchasing a share 
of `10/- and paying a membership fee of `1/-.  A set of 
Table 6. Summary of answers to key questions indicating awareness levels among tendu leaf pluckers
District Union
North Betul 
(Dhar PCS)
Dindori 
North and 
South Sagar
Umaria 
(Pali and Chouri)
Umaria 
(Kohka)
What is the 
collection wage?
Answered correctly
Men quoted a lower 
wage of `550/- 
against `650/- 
per Standard Bag. 
Women quoted even 
lower rates
Answered correctly
Could not answer 
correctly
Answered correctly
Do you know 
that tendu leaf is 
purchased through a 
co-operative society?
Only Phad Munshi and 
one former ‘elected’ 
office-bearer aware
No knowledge except 
among elected office-
bearers and Phad 
Munshi
Only Phad Munshi is 
aware
Men have some 
knowledge; women nil
A small number 
of leaf pluckers 
know because PCS 
Prabandhak resides in 
the village
The co-operative 
society elects 
office-bearers 
through elections. 
Have you ever voted?
No. Not aware 
of elections
No. Not aware 
of elections
No. Not aware 
of elections
No. Not aware 
of elections
No. Not aware 
of elections
Do you know that 
leaf pluckers are 
insured through the 
co-operative society?
Only Phad Munshi is 
aware. Even activists do 
not know
Only a few key 
informants including 
Phad Munshi and NTFP 
traders aware
Only Phad Munshi 
is aware
No. Even Phad Munshis 
were not clear about 
details
No knowledge of 
insurance even among 
activists
(Source: Interviews and household surveys conducted by the authors.)
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performing their functions adequately. So, we also 
assessed the understanding among office-bearers of 
their roles and responsibilities. We found that in spite 
of some of these office-bearers being in office for many 
years, they had less than passing familiarity with the 
structure of the co-operative societies, their purpose, 
and members’ rights and responsibilities (see Table 7). 
The case of an adivasi member of the Prabandh Samiti 
member in the Dhar PCS, Betul was typical: he said that 
he had filled up a form at the behest of the Deputy 
Range Officer to become an office-bearer some years 
earlier, and was invited to a meeting where snacks and 
soft drinks had been served. He innocently wondered if 
he was still part of the ‘Samiti’ (Table 7, row 1). Equally 
typical was the response of the President of the Dindori 
District Union, who could not answer a single question 
regarding how tendu leaf marketing is done, and said 
that the ‘control lies with the Forest Department’ (row 3).
All elected representatives who were interviewed agreed 
that decisions were taken and the operations of the 
co-operative societies executed by Forest Department 
officials, and that the executive committees existed only 
in name. Meetings, if held at all, were organized in the 
Range or Division Office. Monetary transactions at the 
PCS level require the signatures of the PCS Prabandhak 
(the manager) and the Nodal Officer (forest official) and 
not those of any of the elected office-bearers! Although 
the PCS Prabandhak and the DFO (who is the ex-officio 
chief executive of the District Union) are expected 
to carry out the decisions taken by the executive 
committees, it was evident from the body language 
adopted by office-bearers in their presence that the 
matter of authority had been turned upside down. 
The office-bearers appear to have adjusted to this 
situation in different ways. In adivasi areas, many 
office-bearers were content with it. For instance, in the 
Larkui PCS, Sehore, the Prabandh Samiti had remained 
unchanged since its formation in 1989. In our interview, 
one of the office-bearers stated that he did not know 
much about the ‘Samiti’ as all the work was carried 
out by the PCS Prabandhak, but that “the situation 
was quite satisfactory as the Prabandhak was a senior 
and experienced man”. In non-adivasi areas, especially 
Sagar and Vidisha districts, elected office-bearers were 
considerably more assertive. However, since the control 
remained with the Forest Department, the office-bearers 
simply viewed election to the Prabandh Samiti as a first 
step in upward political mobility.
Further, where some elected representatives did try to 
assert their authority, they lacked the power to do so in 
the long run. Bhogal’s study (Bhogal 2000) describes in 
in none of the PCSs covered by the study did it appear 
that general body meetings or any other activity enlisting 
the wide participation of members had been organized 
by the PCS in recent times. 
Elections to the Prabandh Samiti are supposed to be 
held every five years. However, as indicated in Table 6, 
none of our respondents from any of the PCSs had any 
knowledge of elections having been held. Members of 
Executive Committees have either been in office since 
1989, or have lost track of when they came into that 
position, or have been nominated by forest officials in 
an ‘election’ where all candidates appear to have been 
elected unopposed. For instance, the Vice-President of 
the Karanjia PCS, Dindori, an educated adivasi, claimed 
that the eleven members of the Prabandh Samiti were 
elected unopposed because exactly eleven persons 
chosen by the Range Officer and his subordinates had 
filed nominations. 
The fact that nobody bothers about elections or that 
elections are completed behind closed doors with the 
exact number of candidates as there are positions is 
not surprising, since so little seems to be at stake (see 
section 5.4.3). However, it is interesting to note that 
being an office-bearer of a PCS or the DU Sanchalak 
Mandal carries some political importance. For instance, 
the Vice-President of Karanjia PCS and his colleagues 
were approached by the two major political parties 
in the area, the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Indian 
National Congress, during the election of the Adhyaksh 
(President) and Upadhyaksh (Vice-President) from 
among the Prabandh Samiti members. After a tussle 
along party lines and the spending of a significant 
amount of money, he ended up on the losing side and 
had to remain content with the post of Upadhyaksh. 
Similarly, respondents in Sagar District indicated that 
the elections within the Executive Committees for such 
posts, and elections to the DU from among them were 
quite politicized, with local political heavyweights 
treating the elections to the co-operatives as a sparring 
arena. It appears, therefore, that the positions in the 
PCSs and DUs are stepping stones for upward mobility 
in the political process, but not (as we shall see below) 
relevant to the welfare of tendu leaf pluckers.
5.4.3
Awareness among office-bearers and functioning 
of the PCSs
Since elections are meant to keep office-bearers 
accountable to the general membership, it could be 
argued that the absence of regular elections is not 
a major hindrance if the current office-bearers are 
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operative, whether it is in setting up the pre-harvest 
auctions, or in deciding when to harvest and how much, 
what collection wage to pay, whom to appoint as Phad 
Munshi or Prabandhak, what bonus to pay and when, or 
which welfare schemes to operate for their members. 
All decisions are taken by MFPFED, where all operational 
matters are handled by professional foresters, and whose 
governing body is also controlled by state government 
representatives. 
5.5
Summary of performance
In summary, our data show that the MFPFED system is 
not a co-operative marketing system at all. The entire 
system is run top-down, controlled by forest officials and 
governed by political appointees and the state cabinet 
detail the enormous struggles that a women-run PCS in 
Bastar district (then part of MP) faced when it tried to run 
the PCS independent of the Forest Department. In the 
long-run, the PCS had to ‘fall in line’. 
Finally, it may be noted that all the welfare schemes 
introduced by MFPFED run on the basis of the profits 
from tendu leaf sale that are retained by the federation 
instead of being passed to the collectors. The decision 
to use the money towards such schemes comes from 
the top, not from the bottom. Thus, what appear to be 
well-meaning, if not well-implemented, schemes can also 
been seen as the state gaining political mileage out of 
the pluckers’ own hard-earned money.
In short, the PCSs are not co-operative societies at 
all. Pluckers or their elected representatives have no 
role in any of the activities of a typical marketing co-
Table 7. Select observations indicating awareness levels of elected representatives
District Union
Betul
Dindori
Sagar
Sehore
Details of office-bearer
Member, Executive 
Committee, Dhar PCS
Vice-President, 
Karanjia PCS
President, Dindori District 
Union
President, South Sagar 
District Union
Former member, 
Executive Committee, 
South Sagar District 
Union
Member, Executive 
Committee, Larkui Samiti
What they said
Was nominated office-bearer by Deputy Range Officer. 
Remembers attending only one meeting in the last few years in 
which cold drinks and snacks were served. “I do not know if I 
am still in office.”
Was asked by the then DFO to ‘fill up form’ to become member 
of Executive Committee. Complains that all activities are carried 
out by Prabandhak and Forest Range Officer. “Prabandh Samiti 
neither meets nor knows what is happening.”
Could not answer a single question regarding details of tendu 
leaf procurement. “Control lies with the Forest Department.”
“All decisions are taken by the DFO. Meetings are a mere 
formality.”
“I have never collected tendu leaf in my life.” However, a tendu 
leaf collector card is issued to him every season. Complained 
that the Sanchalak Mandal of which he was member was 
dissolved due to political interference by MLA who is a State 
Cabinet Minister.
Has been on the Executive Committee since inception in 1989. 
Says that all details about tendu leaf procurement are known 
only to Prabandhak who gets his orders from Bhopal through 
DFO. “There is only Larkui Samiti and Bhopal, no such thing 
called District Union in between.” 
(Source: Interviews conducted by the authors)
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itself. MFPFED in Bhopal calls for and allocates tenders, 
distributes and recovers working capital, receives 
contractor deposits and payments, sets the collection 
wage and calculates the PCS-wise incentive wage, and 
so on. Elections have not been held for many years, and 
in any case, elected officials of the PCSs have no role 
to play in the management of the PCS. The appointed 
staff and the Forest Department officials run the show 
at both PCS and DU levels. Membership rolls appear 
to be completely out of date, but since membership is 
not essential when contributing leaves to the phad, nor 
is the membership involved in voting since elections 
themselves are hardly held, there is no interest in 
updating these rolls either. The claim that the system is 
‘close to the soul and spirit of PESA’ (which envisages 
democratic self-governance in Scheduled Areas) is 
completely untenable.
If, however, the system is evaluated for what it really 
is, viz., a completely state-run tendu leaf procurement 
system, it may be seen as moderately successful. By 
establishing a system of pooling procurement and sale 
at the PCS-level across the entire state, it does ensure 
a basic minimum price for the tendu leaf pluckers. 
It does not overtly extract royalty from the produce 
for the state coffers, but does extract 30–40% of the 
tender price in the name of ‘forest regeneration’ and 
‘village development’. It is moderately successful in 
obtaining good prices for the product, but less successful 
in distributing the income fully and promptly to the 
pluckers; not just because of the abovementioned 
‘regeneration/development tax’ but also due to low 
upfront disbursement, delays and leakages. It works 
‘sustainably’ in the sense that there is no recurring 
financial liability to the state government, unlike the 
MFP co-operatives of Karnataka (Lélé and Rao 1996), 
although there is some in-kind subsidy in the form of 
the time given by forest officials at the district and sub-
district levels. It also works ‘smoothly’ in that tendu leaf 
procurement takes place regularly without major hitches 
in most regions. 
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Further examination suggests that the ‘co-
operativization’ was perhaps always meant to be 
nominal. This is evident from various features of the 
structure and process used for setting it up. To begin 
with, nearly 2,000 co-operatives were established in a 
period of less than one year in 1988–89, a speed that 
necessarily implies inattention to due process. Initially, 
all office-bearers were nominated. The first elections 
were held only in 1995 (Bhogal 2000). Subsequently, 
it appears that some autonomy was granted to PCSs as 
regards the marketing of some other NTFPs (Bhogal and 
Shankar 2000), but never in the case of tendu leaf. 
Second, even the little autonomy given on paper has 
never been exercised. For instance, the discretion to 
PCSs to distribute up to an additional 30% of the net 
income as incentive wage as per the 1998 G.O.29  was 
never utilized. Third, the three-tier federation that was 
designed by the state government was mapped onto 
the Forest Department’s structure (lots, ranges and 
6.1
Inapplicability of Collective Action Theory
When we began the study, we believed that the MFP 
co-operatives, even if established in a top-down 
manner, were reasonably autonomous collective 
action organizations, federated into the MFPFED. We 
therefore believed that the quality or effectiveness 
of their functioning could be explained at least partly 
through an institutional analysis framework that 
identifies factors affecting the success of collective 
action, including the size of the co-operative, incentive 
structure design and other design elements, the quality 
of leadership, and the level of economic dependence of 
members on the product (Attwood and Baviskar 1988; 
Shah 1995; Oakerson 1992). However, our assessment 
shows that the so-called co-operative (and federation 
of co-operatives) violates most of the basic tenets of 
collective action institutions. 
EXPLAINING 
THE PERFORMANCE
6
29 G.O. no. F-26/8/9710-3 dt.8 May 1998 issued by the Secretary, Forest Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh states that “PESA has given 
ownership of MFPs to Gram Sabhas. In that connection, the state government has decided that (a) only those non-timber forest products will be 
considered as MFPs that can be harvested without destroying the forests; this does not include wildlife or minerals in forest land, (b) as before, the 
harvesting and trade in MFPs will be done by the PCSs under the supervision of the MFPFED. (c) entire net income will be given to the PCSs; PCSs will 
apply at least 20% of this net income towards forest regeneration, at least 50% of the net income will be distributed as incentive wage to the collectors in 
proportion to the produce collected, and the remaining amount may be applied towards village development (basic amenities) or towards incentive wage 
as per the discretion of the PCS” (translated from Hindi by the authors).
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While the colonial and the post-Independence state 
tried to maximize revenues or royalties from tendu 
leaf collection, they could not do this without the 
involvement of tendu leaf contractors – the essential 
link between the product that is spread over the 
forested landscape and the beedi-making industry 
spread across the country. The contractors bid for 
harvesting rights, offered royalty to the state, and hired 
the tendu pluckers as wage labourers to carry out the 
harvest. In the post-Independence period, the tendu 
leaf contractors in MP became increasingly powerful, 
and converted their economic power into political clout 
by getting regularly elected to the state assembly. 
The establishment of the state-level corporation 
in 1984 to carry out monopoly purchase and then 
the state-sponsored complete co-operativization in 
1989 were therefore a somewhat radical departure 
(or attempted departure) from the cosy relationship 
between the state and the contractors. According to 
senior retired officials and Bhogal (2000), the idea 
of co-operative marketing was the brainchild of 
the Congress Chief Minister, Arjun Singh. With the 
contractors aligned with the Bharatiya Janata Party, 
Arjun Singh in his first stint (1980–85) set up the state-
level federation to weaken the contractors’ political 
power. In his second stint, he faced stiff opposition 
from the tendu leaf contractor lobby and was elected 
by a very slender margin in the Khasiya by-election in 
1988. Determined to undermine the political influence 
of the contractors, particularly among marginal leaf-
plucking communities, he moved quickly to dismantle 
the prevailing tendu leaf procurement system and 
restructured it in the form of an extensive co-operative 
society network. Wanting to check the spread of 
Naxalism may also have been a secondary motive 
behind this welfare measure (DN 1989). A few forest 
officers with a reputation for administrative skills and 
integrity were handpicked to handhold and nurture the 
MFP Federation. The move became popular because 
of the higher returns obtained by leaf pluckers in the 
very first collection season in 1989, and the structure 
could not be rolled back even though the Congress 
government lost power soon thereafter.
Subsequently, political representatives, including 
those with links to the tendu leaf contractor and beedi 
maker lobbies, have supported this system as it serves 
as a medium to reach out to a significant vote-bank 
comprising poor forest-dependent communities, 
including large numbers of adivasis. The setting of the 
collection wage each year is deemed consequential 
enough for it to be done at the level of the State Cabinet 
divisions) for their administrative ease. At no point was 
the primary membership consulted about the process 
of federating upwards. Fourth, all executive positions in 
MFPFED are filled by IFS officers, cementing the bond 
between the agency controlling the forest resource and 
agency controlling the co-operatives. Fifth, as perhaps 
a blatant symbol of state control over a so-called co-
operative, the “Rajya Shaasan” (state government) is 
mentioned as a primary member in the bye-laws at each 
of the three tiers. 
Finally, all marketing co-operatives are based on the 
assumption that the members of the co-operative own 
the produce that they choose to pool produce to obtain 
better prices, and therefore, they can also opt out and 
sell the produce through some other channels if they 
are dissatisfied with the functioning of the co-operative. 
However, in the case of tendu leaves in MP (and most 
central Indian states), the produce continues to be 
owned by the state. The legislation passed in 1964 
establishing complete state ownership and control over 
tendu leaves was not modified or withdrawn when the 
so-called co-operative federation was created. Nor did 
the passage of PESA change the situation, as PESA rules 
were never properly interpreted and implemented. 
Even the passage of the Forest Rights Act 2006, which 
explicitly states that forest dwellers have full rights 
over tendu leaf and other minor forest products, has 
not changed the de facto situation, as these provisions 
remain unimplemented in MP. Thus, the entire co-
operative structure is built on a non-existing foundation 
– the tendu pluckers still remain labourers who are 
allowed to pluck state-owned tendu leaves from state-
owned forests and are required to bring the leaves to 
the state-run co-operative.
The presence and persistence of the discussed design 
errors suggest that there are major vested interests 
in keeping the system under state control. While the 
political economy of state forest control in India is well-
documented (Guha 1984; Sundar et al. 2001; Springate-
Baginski and Blaikie 2007); the political economy of 
state-controlled marketing systems is less understood.
6.2
The political economy of the MFPFED system
Tendu leaf is a key material and political resource 
that has been controlled and mobilized by different 
interest groups, other than the pluckers themselves, 
for their own ends. The key groups or actors have 
always been the state and the tendu leaf contractors. 
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Thus, while the official rhetoric, such as on MFPFED’s 
website, has been that “Madhya Pradesh became the 
first state in the country to … transfer … ownership of 
non-wood forest produce to the Gram Sabhas (local level 
Panchayati Raj institutions)”, the MFPFED system is, in 
fact simply a way of negotiating the power relations 
between the political system, the forest bureaucracy 
and the tendu leaf contractors and beedi makers 
(who are often part of the political system). The tendu 
leaf pluckers are appeased by tinkering with wage 
rates, releasing bonuses with political fanfare, and 
announcing some populist welfare measures with the 
pluckers’ own money.
rather than at the level of the MFP Federation. Bonus 
distribution ceremonies become an occasion for political 
leaders to deliver speeches and personally distribute 
the money to a few leaf pluckers. In fact, the distribution 
of bonus is so politically significant that it has to be 
withheld once the Election Commission announces the 
dates of the election and the code of conduct comes 
into force. For instance, the bonus for the year 2008 
was distributed only two years later, in 2010, because 
parliamentary, legislative assembly and local body 
elections were held in succession in 2009 and the code 
of conduct was in force for most part of the year. 
The continued political usefulness of the co-operative 
societies can be gauged from the current leadership 
of the MFP Federation. Although the co-operative 
society bye-laws indicate that the Chairperson of 
the MFP Federation must be a leaf plucker elected 
from among the elected representatives of the DUs, 
the current Chairperson is an MLA from the ruling 
party. Since several MLAs (and usually at least one 
minister) are beedi manufacturers or have close links 
with them, one can say that the political system is 
now intertwined with the beedi maker and contractor 
lobbies rather than standing up for the tendu leaf 
pluckers against the contractors.
At the same time, the Forest Department has emerged 
as a semi-independent player, almost the backbone 
of the system, a development that has both positive 
and negative implications. On the one hand, giving the 
professional foresters a key role appears to have kept the 
system running smoothly with limited overt corruption. 
Indeed, while Forest Department officials at the district 
and PCS levels complain that they are forced to take on 
tasks for which they receive a paltry honorarium, the 
sound financial performance of the MFPFED and the 
functioning of a mammoth system year after year is worn 
as a badge of honour among senior officers who were 
handpicked for their integrity, and have been associated 
with the MFPFED since inception. They believe that 
this has been made possible by avoiding overt political 
interference, and they insist that bureaucratic control 
is essential for the continued success of the MFP 
Federation. On the other hand, when the forest is already 
controlled by the Forest Department, giving them control 
over the marketing of forest produce further consolidates 
their power in the forested landscape and makes forest-
dwellers even more beholden to the bureaucracy. While 
some honest and socially sensitive officers might use this 
power to further or at least safeguard the welfare of the 
pluckers, there is no attempt to increase transparency 
and accountability in functioning, let alone to empower 
the pluckers to manage their own affairs.
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our assessment change? Our analysis in section 5.1 
shows that this procurement system does function 
smoothly, requires no significant state subsidy, and that 
it does generate returns for the tendu leaf pluckers that 
are higher than in some other states, and higher than 
the pre-MFPFED days, thereby protecting the pluckers 
from the extremes of exploitation at the hands of the 
contractors. A major jump in returns occurred in the 
first year of MFPFED creation, but an equally significant 
jump occurred when the state stopped its extraction of 
royalty and began to transfer 60% of the profits back to 
pluckers. This latter policy makes the pluckers far better 
off than in, say, Odisha, where royalties have not been 
abolished (see Table 2). 
However, the overall return is only moderately 
competitive, when compared with other states or with 
the final sale prices to beedi makers. Initial payments 
are low, and final payments are delayed inordinately. 
Maharashtra also does a better job of disbursing bonus, 
by depositing it directly into the collectors’ bank 
accounts. Thus, it appears that after the initial enthusiasm 
and pressure of PESA eased, the system has somewhat 
stagnated and become perhaps more susceptible to the 
pressure of the tendu leaf contractors’ lobby. 
In a study of MFP co-operatives in Karnataka, Lele and Rao (1996) asked “Whose co-operatives and 
whose produce?”, and pointed out that the adivasi 
members of these co-operatives neither own the 
produce nor control their co-operative. The same 
situation prevails in the MFPFED system: the Forest 
Department continues to control the tendu leaf and 
NTFP resource in general, the state controls the PCSs, 
and the tendu leaf contractors control the market. The 
system is better characterized as a state-run tendu leaf 
monopoly procurement system that metamorphosed 
from one focused on royalty maximization for the state 
to one, ostensibly, focused on better returns for the 
pluckers without, however, disturbing state control 
over the forest resource. Indeed, the entire language 
of collection ‘wage’ and incentive ‘wage’ appears to be 
a Freudian slip, suggesting that the government and 
the state-level MFPFED officials still see the tendu leaf 
pluckers as ‘wage labourers’!
Some would argue that it does not matter that the 
system is not really a co-operative federation and 
that pluckers do not have forest rights, as long as the 
economic interests of the tendu pluckers are protected. 
If we viewed the system through that lens, how would 
A DIFFERENT LENS: 
A COSTLESS STATE 
EMPLOYMENT SCHEME?
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Our data, presented in Table 8, show that every 
household spends about 24–28 person-hours per day 
of leaf collection and the collection of leaves ranges 
from 200 to 300 bundles, or 10,000-15,000 leaves 
per day. The returns from this collection are `150–190 
per day for all the labour-time spent if one uses only 
the collection wage, whereas if the tendu leaf pluckers 
were paid the minimum wage of `169 per 8-hour 
working day prevailing in 2011, the returns would have 
been far higher (Table 9). Even after factoring in the 
incentive wage, the returns remain significantly lower 
than the minimum wage. Note that the villages chosen 
for this calculation were such that tendu leaf availability 
and quality were not limiting the return. 
MFPFED officials claimed the collection wage is fixed 
on the basis of an estimate of the number of leaves 
an individual would collect in half-a-day’s work, and 
they believed that the current collection wage was 
adequate to cover that labour-time. However, our data 
suggest that these calculations are outdated. Tendu 
leaf harvesting is a full-time activity employing the 
labour of the entire family. A more accurate picture 
may require labour data drawn from multiple sites of 
tendu leaf collection. However, it is clear that the total 
It has been argued by activists such as Anurag Modi of 
Shramik Adivasi Sangathan that if the system is meant to 
provide livelihoods to tendu leaf collectors and if tendu 
leaf collectors are only wage labourers, then it must 
stand the test of ‘adequacy’ from that perspective, such 
as meeting minimum wage standards. We attempted 
a comparison of the returns obtained per person-day 
by the tendu leaf pluckers with the minimum wage, 
using data we gathered from personal observation and 
interviews with households in two villages, one each 
in Betul and Umaria districts, both regions known for 
abundance of good quality tendu leaves. 
The tendu leaf collection process consists of plucking 
of leaves, making of bundles, and depositing the 
bundles at the phad. Entire households are involved 
in one or more of these activities. The typical division 
of family labour is as follows: two able-bodied adults 
pluck the leaves from dawn to forenoon while adults, 
children and elderly members take turns in the 
preparation of 50-leaf bundles in the afternoon 
(as a conservative equivalent, we assume three adults 
working full-time to tie the leaves into bundles). At the 
end of the day, two able-bodied adults carry the leaves 
to the phad. 
Field site
Jodiyamau 
village (Dhar 
PCS, North 
Betul DU)
Majmanikala 
village (Kohka 
PCS, Umaria 
DU)
Average 
daily 
household 
collection 
of leaves 
(number of 
bundles)
10,900 (218)
14,750 (295)
Average 
time taken 
by the 
household 
to tie up all 
leaves into 
bundles 
3 hours 
45 minutes
3 hours
Average 
time spent 
per person 
in leaf-
plucking 
per day 
7 hours 
45 minutes
8 hours 
Average 
time taken 
at the phad
1 hour 
30 minutes
1 hour
Average 
number 
of leaf-
plucking 
members 
per 
household
2
2
Average 
number of 
household 
members 
carrying 
leaves to 
the phad
2
2
Average 
number of 
household 
members 
engaged 
in tying up 
bundles
4
3
Average 
total time 
taken per 
household 
per day (in 
person-
hours)
28 hours 
30 minutes
24 hours 
15 minutes
Note: The difference in average daily household collection between the two field site is because of relatively higher leaf availability 
and lower distance from the village to the forest in Majmanikala village relative to Jodiyamau.
Table 8. Labour-time analysis of the tendu leaf plucking process (2011 season)
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remuneration to leaf pluckers is not commensurate with 
the labour expended. The irregularities and leakages 
in wage payment further tilt the scales away from the 
leaf pluckers, an outcome that was particularly evident 
in some villages of Dindori and Umaria districts where 
a combination of inadequate returns, irregularities in 
wage payment, and harsh working conditions had led to 
a decline in leaf plucking following the introduction of 
wage employment under the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS).
Table 9. Comparison of remuneration from tendu leaf in 2010 with prevailing minimum wage
Field site
Jodiyamau 
village 
(Dhar PCS, 
North Betul DU)
Majmanikala 
village 
(Kohka PCS, 
Umaria DU)
Average 
number of 
bundles 
collected 
per household 
per day
218
295
Average 
labour per 
household 
per day (in 
person-hours)
28 hours 
30 minutes
24 hours 
15 minutes
Collection 
wage@
` 65/- per 
100 bundles 
of 50 leaves 
each
142
192
‘Bonus’ 
payable for 
average daily 
collection in 
2010 (`)
154
186
Total 
remuneration 
(`)
296
378
Wage payable 
if minimum 
wage@ ` 169/- 
per day was 
taken into 
account (`)
602
512
Note: ` 159/- per day was the minimum wage in Madhya Pradesh from 01.10.2010 to 31.03.2011. This is used as a proxy since 
information on the exact minimum wage in force at the time of the tendu leaf season in 2010 is not available.
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procurement programme to ensure reasonable returns 
to tendu leaf pluckers or it is meant to be a truly bottom-
up federation of co-operative societies of tendu leaf 
pluckers who have resource rights and marketing rights, 
and control and run the co-operative themselves? 
On the one hand, there are a number of measures 
that the state can take within the paradigm of state-
controlled tendu leaf procurement that will benefit 
pluckers in the short run: 
a. Abolish the deductions towards village 
development funds and forest development funds, 
as these are unnecessary ‘taxes’ on the tendu 
pluckers’ wages. This can increase the total return 
by at least 20%.
b. The collection wage can be increased substantially 
so that 75% of the anticipated total return is paid 
outright after the tendu leaves reach the phad.
c. Calculate and distribute the bonus or incentive 
wage within 1 month of receiving the last payment 
from the contractor, which should be not more than 
5 months after the tendu leaf has been collected. 
d. Examine and redress grievances related to 
improper distribution of incentive wages. 
The tendu leaf collection system in MP has been praised not only for assuring tendu leaf pluckers 
an adequate livelihood but also as “the best [sic]
democratic and decentralized system that comes closest 
to the soul and spirit of the PESA” (MoPr 2007). Our 
study shows that the system works smoothly and 
may be seen as providing high returns from certain 
perspectives, but is certainly nowhere near meeting 
goals of democratization or decentralization. Even 
as a state-run procurement system, there are several 
shortcomings, including the diversion of a portion of 
the tendu pluckers’ returns to village development and 
forest development, delays in payments and other forms 
of micro-level harassment. It appears that what started 
out as a pro-plucker initiative has gradually fizzled out, 
and over time the politicians, tendu leaf contractors and 
forest bureaucracy have formed an ‘iron triangle’ that 
protects their interests (votes, prices and forests) while 
mollifying the tendu pluckers with crumbs.
What are the implications that emerge from this 
research for policy makers and the tendu leaf pluckers 
themselves? The implications will vary significantly 
depending upon the ‘normative’ goal of the tendu 
leaf collection activity: is it meant to be a state-run 
SUMMARY AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
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This is of course easier said than done. The 
implementation of the CFR provision in MP is almost 
non-existent (Joint Committee 2010). Also, claiming 
ownership of tendu leaves and, therefore, of the so-
called co-operatives will then place a much greater 
responsibility on the shoulders of the tendu leaf 
pluckers and the forest-dependent communities as 
a whole, as they will have to face the vagaries of the 
market and take on the management of the cash flow, 
the tendering process, the dealings with the contractors, 
as well as tendu leaf pruning and forest management. A 
few villages in Maharashtra have attempted this and the 
process has not been smooth (Dilip Gode, pers. comm.).
Some communities that we spoke to in Betul, who 
have been organized and supported by Shramik 
Adivasi Sangathan, are nevertheless ready to take on 
this challenge. However, they were keenly aware that 
smooth functioning of tendu leaf marketing requires 
significant working capital. If 75% of the tender price is 
to be paid upfront to the pluckers, each PCS would on 
average need `30 lakhs as working capital for at least 
a six-month period, till the contractor pays up all his 
dues. However, they are also aware that the MFPFED’s 
current working capital has been extracted from their 
own wages over the years, and so they are demanding 
that the transfer of resource rights and the control of 
the co-operatives must be accompanied by a transfer of 
working capital from the MFPFED to the PCS.
Most other communities, however, are admittedly far 
from being prepared to take on this challenge, and 
might prefer to function within the older welfare-state 
paradigm and push for improvements within it. The 
question, however, is: whether the state will implement 
even these relatively benign or less radical measures 
without these communities getting organized and 
pressing strongly for improvements. In that sense, there 
is a strong link between the paradigm of short-term top-
down welfare measures and that of long-term bottom-
up empowerment. It is unlikely that the former can 
happen without the latter.
e. Make administrative cost calculations transparent, 
keeping them, say, within 7% of the tender price, 
as Maharashtra manages.
f. Tighter monitoring of the functioning of Phad 
Munshis.
These measures would go a long way in improving 
the pluckers’ lot. In addition, if MFPFED were to invite 
tenders from a wider set of contractors, and link up with 
beedi manufacturers outside the state to directly source 
the tendu leaf to them, they might be able to match the 
prices obtained in Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra.30
On the other hand, if tendu leaf pluckers, adivasis and 
other forest-dependent communities want to better their 
lot in the long run, they will have to demand more than 
a benevolent state-controlled wage labour programme. 
Indeed, even the implementation of the above ‘simple’ 
measures is unlikely to take place unless the tendu leaf 
pluckers assert their rights. Further, the minimum wage 
is a weak right, in the sense that the government could 
very well argue that paying the minimum wage would 
make selling tendu leaves an unviable business and 
shut down the programme. The only long-term rights 
the pluckers have are those given to them notionally 
under PESA and, more concretely and specifically, 
made available under the Community Forest Rights 
(CFR) provision of the FRA, wherein tendu leaf 
ownership is explicitly mentioned. It is only by securing 
resource extraction, management and marketing 
rights simultaneously can these communities extricate 
themselves from the grip of the forest bureaucracy, 
which today controls both the resource and the resource 
marketing channel, i.e., the so-called co-operatives.
This applies to other NTFPs as well, that are currently 
either formally auctioned at the DU level or sold 
piecemeal by individual collectors. Anecdotal evidence 
obtained during our research indicated that NTFPs 
that may be locally as important as tendu leaf do not 
get the attention they deserve, that procurement 
targets are set from Bhopal, and that auctions may 
be faulty. These again point to the limitations of a 
centralized procurement system controlled by the 
Forest Department. While individual officers may 
attempt to improve matters on occasion, sustained 
attention to local specificities and to NTFP harvesters’ 
welfare would only seem possible in a decentralized 
resource management and marketing system controlled 
by the harvesters.
30 If the higher prices in Gadchiroli are because of Naxalite pressure on (or threats to) contractors, then it is not clear how the state can exert such ‘pressure’.
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The commercial use of the tendu leaf appears to be 
closely tied to the origins of the Jabalpur beedi industry 
at the turn of the twentieth century. Lal (2009) suggests 
that the tendu leaf came to be preferred over leaves of 
several other plants that were experimented with for 
wrapping tobacco: astra (Bauhinia variegata), sal (Shorea 
robusta), mango (Mangifera spp.), jackfruit (Artocarpus 
spp.), palash (Butea monosperma), pandanus (Pandanus 
odoratissimus) and banana (Musa spp.).The leaf was 
widely available in the deciduous forests of central 
India, and proved to be superior to its competitors in 
texture and retention of the flavour of the tobacco. 
The demand for tendu leaf from the beedi industry 
was met by contractors. They organized the collection 
from state-owned as well as private lands. While the 
unplucked leaf was sold by auction in the case of 
state-owned lands, contractors could push down prices 
through negotiation with private growers in the case of 
tendu plants growing on private lands (Marothia 1992). 
This gave rise to a lucrative trade. 
Over time, however, growing malpractices raised 
concerns over the loss of revenue to the state and 
the exploitation of private growers. In particular, 
the pilferage and smuggling of tendu leaves from 
Appendix 1
Detailed history of tendu leaf 
marketing in Madhya Pradesh
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Reserved and Protected Forests contiguous to private 
lands gave rise to much heartburn (Shrivastava and 
Choubey 1968). Invoking public interest, the Madhya 
Pradesh Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam was 
passed in 1964 in a move popularly referred to as the 
‘nationalization’ of the tendu leaf. The Act established 
a state monopoly over the tendu leaf trade within MP 
by providing for government-appointed agents to 
procure the leaf and sell to pre-appointed purchasers 
across 1,826 leaf-producing units in the state. However, 
continuing irregularities, arising especially from 
collusion between the agent and the purchaser, blunted 
the impact of the legislation (Bhogal 2000; Boaz 2004). 
In 1980, the existing system was modified by asking the 
purchaser to pay a lumpsum amount (based on annual 
average collection in the previous 15 years) instead of 
payment for actual collection. Additionally, the Madhya 
Pradesh State Co-operative Marketing Federation 
(MARKFED) was appointed collecting agent for some 
of the tendu leaf-producing units (Marothia 1992). By 
this time, the exploitation of tendu leaf pluckers, mainly 
adivasis, had become as much a matter of concern 
as the loss of revenue (Saigal 2008). Consequently, 
the Madhya Pradesh Minor Forest Produce (Trading 
and Development) Co-operative Federation Limited 
(henceforth, referred to as the MFP Federation) was 
established in 1984. Initially, the MFP Federation 
carried out tendu leaf procurement through Large-scale 
Adivasi Multi-Purpose Societies (LAMPS) and Primary 
Agricultural Co-operative Societies (PACS) along with 
MARKFED. However, this was limited to a few districts, 
and intermediaries continued to play a dominant 
role. Besides, the dependence on LAMPS, PACS and 
MARKFED hindered the focus on tendu leaves since 
these organizations were engaged in procuring a wide 
range of primary produce with the tendu leaf being 
relatively peripheral to their operations (Bhogal 2000; 
V. R. Khare, pers. comm.).
Eventually, an elaborate three-tier co-operative 
structure was announced in 1988 and tendu leaf 
procurement across the entire state was brought under 
the wing of the MFP Federation from 1989 onwards 
(Lal and Dave 1991). A total of 1,947 MFP primary co-
operative societies were established across the then 
undivided MP, and clustered under 44 MFP district 
co-operative societies constituted at the level of the 
territorial forest division. The MFP Federation served 
as the apex body of the hierarchical network. Although 
the mandate of the MFP co-operatives included 
procurement of all NTFP, the focus was primarily on the 
tendu leaf. An Implementation and Advisory Committee 
oversaw procurement in tandem with Advisory 
Committees at the district level in the first tendu 
leaf season following collectivization. The leaf was 
auctioned after collection. The move produced instant 
results. The collection wage for leaf-gatherers rose 
to `150 per one Standard Bag. This was a 55% increase 
over the previous year’s wage (Bhogal 2000). The 
operations yielded a net income of `290.45 crores 
(1 crore = 100 million) to the MFP Federation, of which 
a sum of `150 crores was earmarked for distribution as 
incentive wage (commonly known as ‘bonus’) to the leaf 
pluckers (MPMFPCF 2012). The rest was paid into the 
coffers of the state government as royalty. 
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Structure
The present-day MFP co-operative society network in MP 
consists of 1,066 PCSs that are attached to 61 district 
co-operative societies (DUs) under the overall aegis 
of the MFP Federation (see Table 10). The reference 
to ‘district’ is somewhat misleading since the second-
tier societies are actually established at the level of 
the territorial forest division. Several administrative 
districts in MP contain more than one forest division. 
For example, Betul district contains three territorial 
forest divisions – North, West and South. Hence, the 61 
District Unions are spread across 47 out of the state’s 
51 districts (MPMFPCF 2011; MPMFPCF 2012). The 
number of PCSs under a District Union depends upon 
the potential availability of tendu leaf in the area as well 
as the geographical extent of the District Union. Thus, 
the District Unions of Morena, Ujjain, Datia, Shajapur and 
Badwani consist of only one PCS, whereas Chhattarpur 
has 76 and East Sidhi, 75. The average clustering of PCS 
under a District Union seems to range from 10 to 25 (see 
Table 10 for the complete list).
Appendix 2
More details on the structure 
of the current tendu leaf 
co-operative marketing system
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Table 10. List of District Unions in Madhya Pradesh with number of Primary Co-operative Societies under their 
jurisdiction and number of tendu leaf lots which are put out for tender bids (as of 2012).
S. No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
District Union
Alirajpur
Anuppur
Ashoknagar
Badwaha
Badwani
Bhopal
Burhanpur
Chhatarpur
Damoh
Datia
Dewas
Dhar
Dindori
East Chhindwara
East Mandla
East Sidhi
Guna
Gwalior
Harda
Hoshangabad
Indore
Jabalpur
Jhabua
Katni
Khandwa
Khargone
Morena
Narsinghpur
Neemuch
North Balaghat
North Betul
North Panna
North Sagar
North Seoni
North Shahdol
Obedullahganj
Raisen
Rajgadh
Number of PCSs
8
8
11
7
1
8
3
76
18
1
29
13
17
12
12
75
18
4
8
13
3
27
4
30
17
2
1
21
3
31
10
21
22
20
33
15
34
4
Number of lots
5
8
11
7
1
8
3
47
10
1
27
7
16
12
12
71
15
3
8
12
2
21
1
20
17
2
1
20
3
31
10
18
13
20
33
15
25
3
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responsible for procurement and storage, following 
which the lots were auctioned to tendu leaf contractors. 
This changed in 2004, with each lot being sold 
individually by inviting tender bids six months prior to 
collection. The responsibility of procurement from leaf 
pluckers, transport to godowns and storage is now borne 
by the contractor. The leaf is usually sold onward by the 
contractor in October after the stored leaves are sorted 
into three grades according to quality. 
There is a broad division of labour between the three 
rungs of the co-operatives. The primary co-operative 
organizes the pruning of the tendu plants around the 
Operation
The tendu leaf is procured from leaf pluckers and sold 
to tendu leaf contractors in the form of lots. Each lot 
usually represents the total tendu leaf collection of 
one PCS. However, the tendu leaf collection of two or 
more PCSs in the same District Union may be combined 
if their individual leaf production is relatively low. 
For instance, the tendu leaf output of the Karanjia 
and Bajaag PCS in the Dindori District Union together 
comprise one lot. The tendu leaf collection across the 
state is organized by the MFP Federation into 937 
such lots. In the practice followed earlier, the PCS was 
S. No
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
3
21
42
15
3
1
16
35
29
7
10
14
23
24
22
25
1
31
13
10
8
22
51
1,066
3
21
41
15
3
1
15
31
29
7
10
14
18
24
22
15
1
31
13
10
8
22
44
937
District Union
Ratlam
Rewa
Satna
Sehore
Sendhwa
Shajapur
Sheopur
Shivpuri
South Balaghat
South Betul
South Chhindwara
South Panna
South Sagar
South Seoni
South Shahdol
Tikamgadh
Ujjain
Umaria
Vidisha
West Betul
West Chhindwara
West Mandla
West Sidhi
Total
Number of PCSs Number of lots
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wages. The Federation maintains a website that provides 
information on the procurement and sale of tendu leaf 
and other NTFP. In addition to its complete management 
of tendu leaf procurement, it is engaged in the 
manufacture of ayurvedic products marketed under its 
own brand name, Vindhya Herbals. It actively mobilizes 
funds from various state and central government bodies 
for its activities, especially the construction of godowns, 
and the expansion of its NTFP processing and research 
activities. The MFP Federation discharges significant 
financial responsibilities because of the centralized 
tender process for tendu leaf procurement, as a result of 
which funds for payment of collection wage, as well as 
incentive wage, flow downward from the federation to 
the PCS through the District Unions.
Governance 
Any person over the age of 18 years who collects NTFP 
for his/her livelihood is eligible to be a member of the 
local PCS upon purchase of a share and payment of 
the membership fee of one rupee. According to the 
PCS bye-laws, the state government is also deemed 
to be a member. The members together comprise the 
general body. Each PCS is managed by a Prabandh 
Samiti (Executive Committee) consisting of 15 members, 
including:
11 members elected directly by the members of the 
PCS (with reservation for 2 women, and SC, ST and 
OBC members). 
2 members nominated by the DFO from among the 
JFM Committees, whose jurisdiction falls within that 
of the PCS.
2 ex-officio members nominated, one each, by the 
District Union, and the Registrar of co-operative 
societies.
The Prabandh Samiti, which has a term of five years, 
elects an Adhyaksh (President) and Upadhyaksh (Vice-
President) from within itself. At least one of them 
is required to be a woman, as per the bye-laws. The 
Adhyaksh of a PCS operating in a Scheduled Area 
must necessarily be a member of a Scheduled Tribe. 
The Divisonal Forest Officer (DFO) of the concerned 
territorial forest division is empowered to nominate two 
members, which may include the President of any of the 
Joint Forest Management (JFM) Committees falling under 
the jurisdiction of the PCS. The day-to-day operations 
of the PCS are handled by a Manager (Prabandhak), an 
employee of the PCS.  
time of Holi between late February and early March. 
A gap of roughly 60 days is observed between pruning 
and the tendu leaf season. Between early May and mid-
June, the PCS organizes the collection of the leaf 
by setting up collection centres, each of which is called 
a phad. It also appoints a clerk, called the Phad Munshi, 
at each phad. The Phad Munshi is responsible for 
gathering the tendu leaves from leaf pluckers and 
maintaining daily accounts. The responsibility of 
procurement at the collection centres is shared by the 
PCS with the contractor’s employees. The PCS is also 
responsible for issuing collection cards to each leaf-
plucking household, and to update it on a daily basis 
till the end of the season. In addition to the tendu 
leaf, the PCS also organizes the procurement of other 
nationalized or ‘specific’ NTFP such as sal seeds, kullu 
gond and lac. However, the collection of these NTFP is 
episodic. The PCS can declare its intent to purchase non-
nationalized NTFP and coordinate their procurement 
with the support of the District Union. 
The District Union coordinates and monitors the 
procurement of tendu leaf by all the PCS under their 
jurisdiction. It serves as the point of contact for tendu 
leaf contractors. All contractors need to be registered 
with one District Union or the other. The transfer of 
funds for payment (as collection wages and incentive 
wages or ‘bonus’) from the MFP Federation to PCS 
happens through the District Union. Thus, the District 
Union is expected to maintain extensive financial 
records relating to the trade of all NTFP carried out 
through all the PCS in its jurisdiction. Proposals for 
collection of NTFPs other than tendu leaf originating 
from the PCS are expected to be forwarded by the 
District Union to the MFP Federation. As part of its 
wider supervisory role, its responsibilities extend to the 
auditing of PCS finances. It also plays an important role 
in infrastructure development, particularly through the 
construction and maintenance of godowns for storage of 
tendu leaves and other NTFP. 
The MFP Federation is mandated by its bye-laws to 
eliminate the role of middlemen from the trade of 
nationalized forest produce, and to pay special attention 
to the welfare of adivasis. It is also mandated to deal in 
agricultural produce although NTFP forms the focus of 
its activities. In practice, the MFP Federation takes all 
key decisions regarding NTFP procurement and sale in 
the state, particularly in the case of nationalized forest 
produce, of which it remains the sole buyer on behalf 
of the government. This includes the award of tenders 
to tendu leaf collectors, recommending the annual 
collection wage for leaf pluckers that is eventually fixed 
by the State Cabinet, and the declaration of incentive 
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Managing Director, MFP Federation
Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Madhya 
Pradesh, Forest Department
Additional Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, 
Production Division, Madhya Pradesh Forest 
Department
The Board of Directors elect a Chairperson and Vice-
Chairperson from among the elected representatives. 
However, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies is also 
empowered to appoint a Chairperson not below the 
rank of Minister of State, or Secretary, upon the counsel 
of the MP state government. The everyday operations of 
the MFP Federation are handled by a Managing Director, 
who is usually a senior forest officer on deputation from 
the MP Forest Department. 
Tendering
The actual collection of the tendu leaf commences 
between mid-April and mid-May, and ends by mid-June, 
just before the onset of the monsoon. However, the 
procurement process is set in motion in the previous 
November when an online the tender bidding process 
is initiated by the MFP Federation for 937 lots of tendu 
leaf spread across the 1,066 PCS. Tendu leaf contractors, 
who will buy the leaf from the MFP Federation and sell 
them onward to beedi manufacturers, submit tender 
bids at any one of the 16 forest circle offices in the 
state. The MFP Federation declares the production target 
for each lot based on the leaf collection in previous 
years. Furthermore, it calculates an upset price for each 
lot – this remains unannounced – and uses this as a 
benchmark in awarding the tender. For a lot to be sold, 
the winning bid must be the highest among all bids 
and also higher than the upset price. Another round of 
bidding is carried out and fresh bids invited for the lots 
that remain unsold. The tender process runs into three 
or four rounds. Lots that still remain unsold are procured 
by the MFP Federation on its own account and will be 
sold after collection. Since the quality of the leaf varies 
from one geographical region to another, the tender 
prices also vary from one lot to another.
The arrangements made by the MFP Federation for the 
2013 collection season serve as an illustration of the 
pre-harvest tender system. The invitation for tender 
bids was announced on 15 November 2012 along with 
the release of the targeted quantity of each of the 937 
lots in the state. The auction involves three rounds of 
bidding, commencing in December 2012 and spaced 
The District Union is constituted as a federation of 
all the PCSs within its jurisdiction (all of them termed 
ordinary members) and can also include individuals and 
organizations that are suppliers or purchasers of NTFP 
(termed nominal members). The state government is 
recorded as a distinct member under the District Union 
bye-laws. The governing body of the DU is the District 
Union Sanchalak Mandal, and it consists of: 
10 members elected by the Prabandha Samitis of 
the PCSs encompassed within the concerned DU,
2 nominated members: one representing a financial 
institution, and one nominated by the Registrar, Co-
operative Societies, and
2 ex-officio members: the Prabandh Sanchalak (DFO), 
and the President, District Co-operative Central 
Bank.
Two of the 10 elected members are then elected by 
the Mandal as Adhyaksh and Upadhyaksh. The DFO is 
the ex-officio Prabandh Sanchalak (Managing Director), 
and oversees the operations of the District Union under 
the overall leadership of the elected Adhyaksh and 
Upadhyaksh. The DFO is the ex-officio secretary of the 
Sanchalak Mandal.
At the highest tier, the MFP Federation comprises all 
the District Unions, which are regarded as ‘ordinary 
members’. The state government is also recorded in the 
bye-laws as an ordinary member. A second category 
of ‘nominal members’, without voting rights, consists 
of other co-operative societies and individuals that 
are associated with the MFP Federation as purchasers, 
sellers, distributors, contractors or agents. The 
Federation is governed by a Board of Directors. The 
Board consists of 18 members; nine are elected from 
among the District Unions of each of the following nine 
revenue divisions of Madhya Pradesh: Indore, Ujjain, 
Jabalpur, Sagar, Rewa, Bhopal, Hoshangabad, Gwalior, 
and Chambal. Three other members, not below the 
rank of Under Secretary, are nominated by the state 
government from the departments of Forest, Finance 
and Co-operation. The remaining six members are 
appointed ex-officio, and are as follows:
An official of the central government appointed on the 
orders of the Madhya Pradesh government
Secretary, Madhya Pradesh State Department of 
Tribal Welfare, or their representative
Registrar, Co-operative Societies, or their 
representative not below the rank of Additional 
Registrar
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measurement in MP and Chhattisgarh. However, the 
Maharashtra Standard Bag comprises 70,000 leaves 
(each bundle consisting of 70 tendu leaves).
1 quintal refers to the standard unit of weight (100 
kg). Although the tendu leaf is procured in piece-
count by the contractor through the co-operative 
society, it is sold onward by measure of weight.
Payments
The proceeds of the tendu leaf sale are distributed 
in two phases: collection wage and incentive wage 
(‘bonus’). The collection wage is paid during the 
collection season, usually within a week or two of 
actual collection in May–June. It is centrally set by the 
MP State Cabinet upon the recommendation of the 
MFP Federation prior to the collection season every 
year. It is uniform throughout the state (see Table 1). 
Thus, the collection wage across the state in 2010 and 
2011 was `650 per SB, rose to `750 per SB for the 
2012 season, and further to Rs. 950 per SB in 2013. 
The second phase involves the distribution of the 
incentive wage or ‘bonus’. This usually happens more 
than a year after actual collection. As evident from 
the previous section, the contractor is allowed time 
till February of the following year to make good the 
payment to the MFP Federation. As a result, the process 
of completing the accounts for the previous season 
begins only in late February or March and takes some 
weeks. By this time, the next tendu leaf season has 
already begun and the co-operative societies are 
engaged in the collection process. Consequently, the 
payment of incentive wage is further delayed and is 
usually paid around the time of Dussehra or Diwali to 
coincide with the festival season. 
The incentive wage is calculated separately for each 
of the 937 lots. This is because each lot is tendered 
separately and sold at a distinct price. This can be 
seen from Table 4, which displays the tender price 
and collection wage for eight PCS across four District 
Unions for the year 2010. The incentive wage presented 
alongside was actually paid out only in the second 
half of 2011. Unlike the uniform collection wage, 
the incentive wage varies from one tendu leaf lot to 
another with each leaf-plucking household receiving an 
incentive wage in proportion to the quantity collected 
by it over the entire tendu leaf season. As Table 4 
shows, the incentive wage varies between two PCS 
even within the same District Union.
three weeks apart from each other (see Table 11). Only 
lots that remain unsold will proceed to the next round 
of bidding. The bids are opened in one of any three of 
the following places: Bhopal, Jabalpur or Rewa. At the 
time of submission of the tender, contractors must pay 
8% of the contract amount as Earnest Money Deposit 
(EMD). However, the payment of the rest of the contract 
amount is expected only after the tendu leaf season. 
Contractors can pay in four instalments spaced roughly 
eight weeks apart beginning October 2013 (see Table 
12). Thus, the 2013 tendu leaf season actually stretches 
from November 2012 to February 2014.
Units
Before we describe the payment procedures, it would 
be useful to clarify the units that are typically used.
1 bundle is a bunch of 50 tendu leaves tied together.
100 bundles is a count of 5,000 leaves.
1 Standard Bag (SB) comprises 1,000 bundles or 
50,000 tendu leaves, and is the standard unit of 
Table 11. Bidding schedule for the 2013 collection season
Table 12. Instalment payment dates for the 2013 season
Tender round
First
Second
Third
Last date for 
submission of 
tender bids
21.12.2012
15.01.2013
05.02.2013
Instalment Details
First instalment
Second instalment
Third instalment
Fourth and final instalment
Date of 
opening 
of bids
22.12.2012
16.01.2013
06.02.2013
Date of payment
05.10.2013
21.11.2013
06.01.2014
21.02.2014
(Source: Tender advertisement for the 2013 season.)
(Source: Tender notice, Part I,  for the 2013 season. Retrieved 
on 25 December 2012 from the website of the MFP Federation: 
http://www.mfpfederation.org/Website/content/lot_list.asp.) 
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As mentioned earlier, tendu leaf lots remaining unsold 
are procured by the MFP Federation at its own cost. 
These are disposed of after collection if a buyer is 
found. Such transactions usually result in a net loss to 
the MFP Federation. In such cases, leaf pluckers will 
be paid the collection wage but they will not receive 
an incentive wage. This phenomenon is observed in 
Sagar District where leaf pluckers in several PCS have 
received no incentive wage in some years (see Tables 
14 and 15 in Appendix 3).
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The proximity of beedi-making factories in Sagar District 
has given rise to intermediaries who illegally purchase 
the tendu leaf directly from the leaf-collectors and sell 
them onward to the beedi-makers, bypassing the 
co-operative societies altogether. Consequently, tendu 
leaf lots sometimes remain unsold, and these are 
procured by the Federation at its own expense to be 
sold by auction after harvest, inevitably at a loss due 
to low prices. While this ensures that leaf-collectors’ 
interests are partially protected by ensuring that they 
receive a collection wage, the costs borne by the 
Federation appear to be distributed across the District 
Unions going by the non-payment of bonus in several 
PCS. At the same time, leaf pluckers maintain that 
collection centres are often prematurely closed, 
or leaves are rejected on the pretext of quality, in order 
to compel them to sell in the black market. The following 
tables show the tender prices and incentive wage/bonus 
per Standard Bag in three PCSs each of North and South 
Sagar District Unions for the years 2006–11 (Table 14 
and Table 15). These figures are compared with the 
average across the state (Table 13). The payment of 
bonus is the exception rather than the norm even where 
the tender prices are higher than the state average, 
suggesting that losses are recouped through cross-
subsidization across the District Union at the cost of 
bonus payment to leaf pluckers. 
Appendix 3
Tendu leaf trade 
in Sagar district
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Table 13. Tender price, incentive wage and average administrative expenditure per Standard Bag averaged across all 
tendu leaf lots in Madhya Pradesh
Table 14. Tender price and incentive wage in rupees per Standard Bag for three PCSs in North Sagar District Union
Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Collection 
wage (`/SB)
400
450
550
550
650
650
Hirapur PCS (Lot # 323) Bara PCS (Lot # 329) Bhangarh PCS (Lot # 338)
Tender price
1,261
1,497
991
1,091
1,127
Tender price
745
1,129
66
225
1,009
Tender price
385
1,101
552
1,001
1,632
Incentive wage
8
No bonus
No bonus
No bonus
11
Incentive wage
No bonus
No bonus
No bonus
No bonus
No bonus
Incentive wage
No bonus
No bonus
No bonus
No bonus
132
Average tender price 
(`/SB)
842
1,543
1,158
1,296
1,569
1,817
Madhya Pradesh
North Sagar District Union
Average administrative 
expenditure (`/SB)
160
115
198
181
196
253
Average incentive wage 
(`/SB)
153
490
212
303
389
576
Note: 
1. The table is based on data publicly displayed on the website of the MFPFED 
 (http://mfpfederation.org/Website/content/tendupatta.html; last accessed on 29/12/2013). 
2. Average tender price is calculated by dividing total sale proceeds by total tendu leaf collection.
3. Average incentive wage is calculated by dividing total incentive wages paid by total tendu leaf collection
4. Average administrative expenditure per SB = expenditure per SB (total expenditure % total leaf collection) - 
 collection wage per SB
Note: Figures in red indicate that the tender price was too low to allow for a positive net income. (Source: Data collected from the 
Prabandhaks of each PCS.) 
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Table 15. Tender price and incentive wage in rupees per Standard Bag for three PCSs in South Sagar District Union
Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Tada PCS (Lot # 361)  Arjuni PCS (Lot # 362) Nanhi Deori PCS (Lot # 363)
Tender price
867 
 1,309 
 1,102 
 1,132 
 1,289 
Tender price
781 
 1,309 
 1,075 
 1,132 
 1,269 
Tender price
1,021 
 1,324 
 117 
 452 
 958 
Incentive wage
No bonus 
 361 
 No bonus 
 361 
403
Incentive wage
No bonus 
 361 
 No bonus 
 No bonus 
 230
Incentive wage
No bonus
No bonus
No bonus
No bonus
44
South Sagar District Union
(Source: Data collected from the Prabandhaks of each PCS.)
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Table 16. List of District Unions and PCS covered for the study
Appendix 4
Additional information 
from studied PCSs
S. No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Forest Division
West Betul
North Betul
Dindori
North Sagar
South Sagar
Sehore
Umaria
Vidisha
PCSs
Chirapatla
Chunahazuri
Dhar
Medhapani
Shahpur
Karanjia
Nighori
Bara
Bhangarh
Hirapur
Arjuni
Nanhi Deori
Tada
Kesli
Gourjhamar
Larkui
Budhni
Bandhwawara
Chouri 
Karkeli
Kohka
Pali 
Raipur
Sundardadar
Pauanala
 Lot #
204
205
194
186
192
1,746 
(along with Bajag PCS)
1,749
329
338
323
362
363
361
360
368
239
235
779
777
712
716
780
723
781
261
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S. No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
District Union
Morena
Sheopur
Gwalior
Datia
Shivpuri
Guna
Ashoknagar
Nimach
Ratlam
Ujjain
Shajapur
Dewas
Indore
Dhar
Jhabua
Alirajpur31 
Khargone
Badwaha
Badwani
Sendhwa
Khandwa
Burhanpur
North Betul
South Betul
West Betul
Harda
Hoshangabad
Sehore
Bhopal
Rajgadh
Vidisha
Obedullahganj
Raisen
North Sagar
South Sagar
Damoh
Procurement 
in 2011 (in SB) 
1,400 
 26,300 
 2,000 
 500 
 45,700 
 35,600 
 20,500 
 11,800 
 3,500 
 1,200 
 2,300 
 83,900 
 2,200 
 5,700 
 6,000 
NA
 4,300 
 10,400 
 400 
 3,800 
 35,300 
 5,400 
 33,000 
 16,400 
 21,400 
 23,400 
 30,800 
 26,900 
 24,900 
 7,700 
 40,800 
 25,300 
 63,000 
 22,600 
 27,200 
 19,200 
Procurement in 
2012 (in SB) 
1,500 
 26,800 
 2,200 
 600 
 46,000 
 38,000 
 24,000 
 12,700 
 3,800 
 1,300 
 2,300 
 88,400 
 2,200 
 5,800 
 1,900 
 4,500 
 4,400 
 10,700 
 500 
 3,900 
 36,800 
 5,600 
 34,300 
 16,100 
 21,900 
 25,200 
 32,200 
 29,200 
 24,800 
 8,700 
 42,900 
 25,700 
 60,900 
 23,400 
 29,500 
 20,900 
Number of 
PCSs
1
16
4
1
35
18
11
3
3
1
1
29
3
13
4
8
2
7
1
3
17
3
10
7
10
8
13
15
8
4
13
15
34
22
23
18
Average sale 
price (`/SB) 
1,362 
 1,630 
 1,304 
 Unsold 
 1,429 
 1,452 
 1,339 
 1,532 
 1,237 
 1,003 
 1,033 
 1,796 
 1,603 
 1,509 
 1,233 
NA
 1,578 
 1,698 
 1,221 
 1,577 
 1,775 
 1,981 
 2,126 
 2,196 
 2,386 
 2,246 
 2,299 
 1,932 
 1,304 
 1,291 
 1,433 
 1,929 
 1,757 
 1,521 
 1,469 
 1,384 
Average sale 
price (`/SB)
 1,586 
 2,096 
 1,659 
 1,786 
 1,909 
 1,941 
 1,722 
 1,836 
 1,590 
 1,279 
 2,351 
 2,396 
 2,118 
 2,050 
 1,689 
 1,495 
 2,024 
 2,454 
 1,877 
 1,729 
 2,607 
 2,564 
 2,903 
 3,105 
 3,431 
 3,635 
 3,284 
 2,493 
 1,535 
 1,543 
 1,897 
 2,589 
 2,417 
 1,488 
 1,900 
 1,784 
Table 18. Average tender price and procurement in each District Union for 2011 and 2012
31 The Alirajpur District Union appears to have come into existence in 2011-12 after a new Alirajpur Territorial Forest Division was created in that year. 
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37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
Total
Tikamgadh
Chhattarpur
North Panna
South Panna
Satna
Rewa
West Sidhi
East Sidhi
Umaria
North Shahdol
South Shahdol
Anuppur
North Balaghat
South Balaghat
Dindori
West Mandla
East Mandla
Katni
Jabalpur
North Seoni
South Seoni
Narsinghpur
South Chhindwara
West Chhindwara
East Chhindwara
 19,300 
 94,500 
 37,300 
 25,100 
 93,500 
 42,700 
 1,27,600 
 2,00,800 
 1,17,500 
 1,00,900 
 60,200 
 24,500 
 68,200 
 65,500 
 58,300 
 82,600 
 57,200 
 52,900 
 52,000 
 51,400 
 57,900 
 45,600 
 24,400 
 21,900 
 27,400 
 23,00,000 
 19,800 
 1,00,000 
 39,200 
 25,100 
 89,400 
 42,800 
 1,23,100 
 1,99,100 
 1,12,000 
 1,02,600 
 59,200 
 23,800 
 70,000 
 64,700 
 55,200 
 79,400 
 55,400 
 53,700 
 53,400 
 50,300 
 56,100 
 45,000 
 25,200 
 21,500 
 27,400 
 
23,13,000 
25
76
21
14
42
21
51
75
31
33
22
8
31
29
17
22
12
30
27
20
24
21
10
8
12
1,066
 1,074 
 1,337 
 1,768 
 1,495 
 1,557 
 1,324 
 1,716 
 1,619 
 2,065 
 1,705 
 1,718 
 2,046 
 2,130 
 1,773 
 2,115 
 2,284 
 2,440 
 1,406 
 1,680 
 2,293 
 2,244 
 1,998 
 2,017 
 2,517 
 2,169 
 1,322 
 1,794 
 2,312 
 1,874 
 2,123 
 1,679 
 2,331 
 2,064 
 3,184 
 2,437 
 2,616 
 2,905 
 2,873 
 2,189 
 3,245 
 3,164 
 3,321 
 1,784 
 2,153 
 3,394 
 3,163 
 2,539 
 2,733 
 3,352 
 3,106 
S. No. District Union Procurement 
in 2011 (in SB) 
Procurement in 
2012 (in SB) 
Number of 
PCSs
Average sale 
price (`/SB) 
Average sale 
price (`/SB)
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PCS
Led by a 15-member executive committee (Prabandh 
Samiti), whose composition is as follows:
1. Eleven members elected directly by the members of 
the PCS (with reservation for two women, and SC, ST, 
and OBC members)
2. Two members nominated by the DFO from among the 
JFM Committees, whose jurisdiction falls within that 
of the PCS
3. Two ex-officio members nominated, one each, by 
the District Union, and the Registrar of Co-Operative 
Societies
The key functions of the Prabandh Samiti are as follows:
a. Maintaining and regularly scrutinizing accounts/
financial records
b. Calling General Body Meetings, at least once in a 
financial year
c. Preparing annual report + annual statement of 
accounts
d. Recommending distribution of profits to the General 
Body
e. Purchasing and selling NTFP as well as agri produce in 
accordance with the directions of the MFPFED
Appendix 5
Constitution and roles of executive bodies 
of each tier in the MFP co-operatives in 
Madhya Pradesh
(Based on the bye-laws framed under the Madhya Pradesh 
Co-operative Societies Act, 1960)
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Jabalpur, Sagar, Rewa, Bhopal, Hoshangabad, 
Gwalior, and Chambal. 
2. Three nominated directors, comprising the Principal 
Secretaries (or an officer not below the rank of Under-
Secretary) of the Forest, Finance and Co-operative 
Departments
3. Six or more ex-officio directors, consisting of:
Central Government officers appointed under the 
directions of the Government of Madhya Pradesh
Secretary, Department of Tribal Welfare, or a 
representative
Registrar, Co-operative Department, or a 
representative not below the rank of Additional 
Registrar
Managing Director, MFPFED
PCCF, Forest Department
Additional PCCF (Production), Forest Department
The key functions of the Sanchalak Mandal are as 
follows:
a. Entering into commercial and financial transactions
b. Applying for patent rights, trade rights, copyright 
in furtherance of the aims and goals of the MFP 
Federation
c. Entering into legal agreements, legal proceedings; 
dispute-resolution
d. Auditing accounts, preparing annual budget + annual 
report, and presenting the same to the GB
e. Determining a pricing policy for NTFPs
6. Appointing Prabandhak, Phad Munshis with the 
approval of the Prabandh Sanchalak. 
District Union
Led by a 14-member board of directors (Sanchalak 
Mandal), whose composition is as follows:
1. Ten members elected from among the Prabandh 
Samitis of the PCSs encompassed within the 
concerned DU
2. Two nominated members: one representing a 
financial institution, and one nominated by the 
Registrar, Co-operative Societies
3. Two ex-officio members: the Prabandh Sanchalak 
(DFO), and the President, District Co-operative Central 
Bank
The key functions of the Sanchalak Mandal are as 
follows:
a. Preparing the annual budget 
b. Entering into commercial transactions related to 
movable and immovable properties 
c. Determining prices of commodities, fees, charges, etc. 
with the counsel of the MFP Federation 
d. Organizing NTFP collection, wage payment, storage, 
and transport
e. Authorizing the Prabandh Sanchalak to carry out the 
activities described above
f. Entering into arbitration, legal proceedings, or 
adopting dispute-resolution measures
g. Auditing accounts
The Prabandh Sanchalak, a position held ex-officio 
by the DFO, has executive powers. He/She is the 
authorized signatory in the case of all financial 
transactions of the DU. As mentioned earlier, the 
appointment of the Prabandhak and Phad Munshis 
at the PCS level must be carried out with the prior 
approval of the Prabandh Sanchalak. 
MFP Federation
The executive body is called the Sanchalak Mandal 
(Board of Directors), and comprises 18 or more 
members, the composition being as follows:
1. Nine elected directors, one each from District 
Unions in the revenue divisions of Indore, Ujjain, 
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